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ABSTRACT 
Title of Thesis: A Monetary Base Analysis and Control Model for Turkey 
Haluk Ferden Gurse l , Master of Arts, 1976 
Thesis Directed by: Robert L. Bennett, Associate Professor, Department of 
Economics 
A monetary base analysis and control model is the focus of the paper. In 
the first chapter, the monetary base approach is presented and the links between 
monetary base, money supply and money income are shown. Further, the monetary 
policy prob lems of the developing countries are reviewed. 
The second chapter describes the institutional framework for Turkey. Here, 
as background information, the Central Bank, the Treasury and the State Economic 
Enterprises are examined from a monetary po licy viewnoint. Also the stability of 
prices, the credit system, interest rates, money and security markets and foreign 
sector developments in recent decades are summarized. 
In the third chapter, the model which highlights the essentials of monetary 
base control is constituted. Here, the "direct" control of reserve money sources 
is suggested, and given the exogenously determined components of reserve money 
sources, the limits on the range of deliberate Central Bank-Treasury asset changes, 
through exchange rate, rediscount rate, open market interventions, etc. , are 
estimated. The recommended use of the policy variable defined is explained in 
the last chapter. 
INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the oldest and best established proposition in monetary theory 
states that the government or central bank controls the nominal stock of money 
while the public decides on the price level at which it willingly holds the nominal 
1 
stock. 
But the question for most underdeveloped countries (as well as some de-
. veloped countries recently) is to limit the growth of money supply without prej udicing 
economic stability and existing emoloyment in an effort to control the movement of 
prices and money income. For such a task, many instruments are available and 
different policies may be formulated. 
In this study, we will concentrate in a short-run monetary ana lysis and con-
trol model for Turkey, formulated in terms of monetary base source control. 
In the first chapter the monetary base control approach is explained and, in 
a money stock adjustment model, the effectiveness of the control of the monetary 
base is investigated. 
A second chapter gives the institutiona l characteristics of the Turkish 
economy in various areas which are important in the determination of money, 
The next chapter explains the monetary base model used, Here, starting 
with the assumption of at least partial exogeneity of the money supply, the relations 
between nominal income , money supply and the monetary base are empirically 
1 
Meltzer, Allan H., "Controlling Money, 11 Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis Review, May 1969, p. 21. 
ii 
tested o The model also assumes that in the short-run foreign reserve accumulation 
and commercial banking system credit from central bank are essentially determined 
exogenously to the model. Then, recognizing that the monetary authorities can only in-
directly affect e noogenously determined variables, we examine the components of the base 
separately in an attempt to assess their individual susceptibility to policy control. 
Having distinguished the exogeneously determined variables and those which 
can be controlled by the monetary authorities we can then determine the de-
sired change in the base and design a method for implementing it through the 
control variables. 
Finally tentative policy recommendations derived from the model, which 
could be useful for other similar developing countries, are summarized in the last 
chapter. 
It should be stressed however that it is different and an easier matter to 
identify a set of recommended policy measures than to implement them. Required 
measures of the necessary magnitude and timing may not be politically feasible, with 
the possible consequences of continuing or accelerating inflation and unstable growth 
which pose the threat of an ultimately more painful and large sea le adjustment 
process in the future. 
iii 
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CHAPTER 1 
The Monetary Base and Its Importance in 
Controlling Money 
A. Definiton of the Monetary Base 
In recent years, there has been much research on the relationship between 
total expenditures, prices, and monetary aggregates. This discussion also ad-
dresses the question of which monetary aggregate is the most influential and which 
should be used as a target policy variable. While some writers
1 
present evidence 
supporting the effectiveness of discretionary monetary policy, others 2 question 
the ability of monetary authorities to control the quantity of the money supply in the 
short run. 
The proponents of the use of monetary aggregates as policy variables do not 
agree as to which of these aggregates have stable relationships. Evidence from 
discussions suggests that the monetary base recently has achieved prominence as 
3 4 
a measure of monetary influence on the economy. The monetary base can be 
1 . 
For example see: Meltzer, Allan H., "Controllrng Money," Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, May 1969, pp. 16-24. 
2 
See: Maisel, Sherman, "Controlling Monetary Aggregates, University of 
Michigan, March 11, 1969 Speech," Federal Reserve of St. Louis, 1970. 
3 
Andersen, Leonall C. and Jerry L. Jordan, "The Monetary Base - Explana-
tion a nd Analytical Use," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, August 1968, 
p. 7. 
4 
Sometimes called "reserve money, 11 "source base 11 (Andersen-Jordan), 
11high-powered money11 (Friedman-Schwartz-Cagan); Brunner-Meltzer prefer 
"monetary base. 11 
expressed in the following form: 
s 
M = RE.r (1) 
where Ms= properly defined money s upply, r = money supply multiplier and 
RE = base. "Use" of the monetary base consists of non-borrowed reserves of the 
commercia l banking system and currency holdings of the commercial banking system 
o lus public currency holdings. On the other side, "sources" of reserve money can 
be expressed as go ld and foreign reserve holdings of the Central Bank plus Central 
Bank credits in various forms (i.e. , rediscounts, advances or direct credits). 
"Base use" is equa l to "base sources." 
If income and price changes are assoc iated with changes in the money supply , 
then controlling the money supply would a llow control of the former variab les . In 
turn, it should be demonstrated that there exists a stable relationship between the 
money supp ly and the monetary base which can be defined through the money multi -
pliers. Meanwhile, the monetarist proposition a lso assumes that fisca l policy is not 
important in affecting output. Meltzer says that "evidence from past periods suggests 
that the monetary base is the most important determinant of the money supp ly and there 
5 
is a high degree of association between the base and money stock . " 
The contro l of the money supply through the monetary base, in the first place 
would depend on the availability of information about the comnonents of the base and 
their oredictability. If the current monetary base figures would be obtained promptly 
and change s of each variable would be estimated with sufficient precision , the money 
supply changes can be ana lyzed as a monetary base stock adjustment form, the 
5Me ltzer, "Controlling Money ," p. 18. 
2 
adjustment period depending on the time required for the availability of data and 
reaction of the monetary authorities. 
B . Operation of Reserve Money Models 
In such a model, the first set of problems involves : 
1, To get an accurate estimate of the size of the current change in 
the target variable, 
2 . To have a clear idea of the desired value of the target variable 
(monetary base in our case), 
3. An ability to translate the longer term goals of monetary policy 
into a desired current value of the target and to translate changes 
in the target into changes in the rate of inflation, level of em-
ployment or balance of payments. 
6 
Obviously, the last one is the most difficult task to accomplish. 
After calculating the size of the desired change in the target variable, the 
question becomes how a desired change can be implemented, Clearly, not all the 
components of the monetary base are eq~)ly s ensitive for defensive operations . That 
is , cer tain components are more amenable and effecitve policy instr uments. One can 
make a distinction between "autonomously determined 11 (or so-called non- contro lled) 
a nd "control" variables. In other words, some components of the reserve money, 
determined elsewhere in the economy, would follow their paths, while s ome other s c ould 
be changed by policy actions. 
6 . 
Meltzer, "Controllrng Money, 11 p . 20. 
3 
C. Policy Problems in Developing Countries 
Having our "control base" variable we can accomplish the desired changes 
using various measures. 
The policy measures available for developing countries are, in general, 
somewhat different from the ones available to the developed countries. In fact, 
following Dorrance, they can be classified in five groups. 
7 
1. Direct regulation of deposit-money bank lending, 
2. Open market operations, 
3. Variation of deposit-money bank reserve requirements, 
4. Manipulation of government accounts, 
5. Control of central bank credit to the deposit-money banks. 
Another measure, changes in the exchange rates should be added to this list. 
One can object to the use of the first measure by developing countries on the 
grounds that such a system of controls, since it would involve specific controls over 
the actions of the individua 1 institutions, is more likely to freeze the status quo 
rather than to encourage competitive portfolio adjustment. 
8 
Open market operations, as their names suggest, are the purchases or 
the sales of securities in a money market. Although for developed countries this 
tool is considered one of the most effective control mechanisms, for developing 
7 
Dorrance, Graeme S., "Instruments of Monetary Policy in Countries 
Without Highly Developed Capital Markets", International Monetary Fund Staff 
Papers, Vol. XU, July 1965, p . 272. 
8
0p. cit . , p. 273. 
4 
countries it can be dismissed for at least two reasons: there is no money market, 
and there are few bonds. In fact, money is used strictly for transaction purposes 
and has little speculative value. However, money may be used as a store of value. 
Po lak 
9 
exp lains this situation saying: 
There is little in between. Treasury bills, government bonds, prime 
industrial bonds, readily marketable shares -- all these assets that 
form the transition between money and real assets in countries with 
fully developed financial systems p lay a minor role in the asset struc-
ture of the less developed countries -- (And) there is little room for 
short - run changes between money and real assets on the basis of 
changes in the rate of interest. 
A third measure which does not require any change in monetary authorities 1 
(Central Bank) assets is changes in legal reserve requirements. However, there is a 
possiblity that if, due to their expectations, the banking system would change their 
cash reserves legal reserve deposit relation, then, the effectiveness of this measure 
would be reduced. In other words, if cash reserves, expr essed as a ratio of legal 
reserve requirements are constant, then this measure is likely to have a larger imnact . 
In particular, it may prove to be a most useful instrument in dealing with crisis or 
near-crisis situations (putting a genera l contractionary pressure on the monetary system). lO 
Manipulation of government accounts refers to where government deposits 
are to be held. If they are in deposit-money banks, they are adding to the reserves 
of the banks; therefore, they are contributing to the increases in money supply. 
Transfer of these funds to the central bank or treasury would have an effect similar 
9
Polak, J.J., "Monetary Ana lysis of Income Formation and 1-'ayment Problems" 
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. XI (1947-58), p. 39. 
10
norrance, op cit., p. 276. 
5 
to the reduction of the monetary base or sale of securities, if it could be assumed 
that the public could not entirely offset the effect of the Central Bank action. 
Another measure we can include in this category, among the ones available 
to the developing countries, is the control of central bank credit to the commercial 
banking system. For developed countries this type of credit is considered, among 
other things, as a function of the interest rate paid on rediscounted papers by the 
commercial banking system. In fact, in most developing countries, where financial 
markets are in an early stage of evaluation, the desire of a community to borrow is 
likely to be almost insatiable at any reasonable level of interest rates. 
11 
In this 
case, the Central Bank may exercise other types of controls (for example, credit 
limits or selective credit preferences, etc.). 
The last tool, changing the exchange rates, requires a closer look. Although 
12 
it is primarily suggested to restore the balance of payments, there are monetary 
consequences arising from it. Suppose a small country which cannot affect the 
world monetary system had devalued its currency. That means in terms of foreign 
currency its real cash balances are reduced and the people in this country are induced 
to restore their real cash balances to previous levels. That is an inducement toward 
a higher nominal money supply. Meanwhile there is a once-for-all balance of payment 
surplus in terms of domestic currency arising from this government operation. The 
foreign reserves evaluated at the new rate now have a higher value in terms of domestic 
11 
Dorrance, op. cit., p. 278. 
12
For example see: Mundell, Robert L., "The Appropriate Use of Monetary 
and Fiscal Policy for Internal and External Stability," International Monetary Fund 
Staff Papers, Vol. IX (March 1962), pp. 70-85. 
6 
currency. Since this "impact effect" of the devaluation is a result of a monetary 
authority's (government) decision, the change should be considered autonomous in 
nature. 
But the developments following the change in the exchange rate , that is, new 
export earnings and capital inflow less import expenditures, shortly balance the 
movements arising from the application of the new rates and are not determined by 
monetary authorities' action itself; they result from the operation of the economy. At 
this stage, the foreign reserve accumulation is exogenous to the monetary system. 
If there is no sterilization (or neutralization) of the inflow, then the money supply would 
be increased through an increase in reserve money caused by the increased foreign 
asset holdings of the monetary system. Also in most developing countries, since 
imports are heavily taxed, import proceeds would increase by devaluation (or vice 
versa). This may be considered as an alternative to government credit from the 
13 
Central Bank, at least in the short-run. 
Most countries feel that some amount of foreign asset holdings is required 
either to avoid interruptions in foreign transactions or, since changes in the reserve 
accumulation are considered a signal of over- or under-valuation of the domestic 
currency, to assure the confidence in their currency by foreigners and by their own 
citizens. So, almost every country holds a foreign asset reserve, the size depending 
on various variables . 
13 
Strictly speaking, this increase in import tax nroceeds would depend on the 
demand elasticities of import goods. Since the goods upon which tariffs are imposed 
are necessities, a higher tariff rate will reduce demand but will increase tariff revenues. 
7 
Now suppose that a country, because of canital outflow, is running down its 
foreign reserves. Since this signals that the domestic currency is over-valued, it 
requires, among other things, a decrease in the value of domestic currency to 
reach its equilibrium value, that is to obtain balance of payments. But government 
may require a certain size of foreign reserve stock adjustment also. In this case, 
in general, to obtain the desired amount through the balance of payments, the 
country is willing to pay a premium over the discounted value of the future price 
of its currency. That means a country should apply an exchange rate below its 
equilibrium value or it should accept an under-valued domestic currency price. In 
this case the under-valuation would depend on the size of the desired foreign ex-
change stock and the time available to obtain this stock. 
In general, the faster an accumulation of reserves is desired, the greater 
domestic price changes take place; since during a quick accumulation, sterilization 
and/or similar resulting operations cannot be accomplished, at the same speed as 
contributions of the new reserves acquired, then monetary base will grow faster, 
which, in turn, would lead to a relatively higher increase in money supply and 
domestic prices. When prices and the money supply are high enough to restore the 
old real cash balances, foreign reserve accumulation will stop. And thereafter to 
start the cycle a new devaluation would be required. 
The equilibrium value of domestic currency (including desired foreign 
reserve stock) cannot be calculated easily in developing countries and these countries 
have a tendency to under-value their currency by a substantial margin, which in 
turn usually will cause a larger inflationary impact. To prevent this, the monetary 
8 
base and the money supply should be severely restricted. Among the other ways 
leading to sterilization, a trial and error mechanism could be suggested. In other 
words, one could begin with a greater devaluation than required; when a larger (than 
desired) capital inflow was observed, then one could proceed with a revaluation of 
the currency, and following the results resort to further devaluation or revaluation 
as required to move towards the equilibrium path of the value of the currency. Such 
a program would be appropriate under the following circumstances: 
1. If the central bank has reliable information about the price elas-
ticity of foreign currencies. 
2. If frequent changes do not change the expectations about future 
prices of domestic currency; that is, first, in terms of specula-
tion which might be unstabilizing, second, in terms of business-
men, who would seek greater profit margins to hedge against 
the variations in exchange rates. 
In practice, these conditions cannot be fulfilled easily. Although in the case 
of over-valuation of the domestic currency, devaluation is recognized as a means 
of restoring the balance of payments, in the case of an under-vlaued currency, the 
alternative revaluation, is not in general widely accepted. 
Turkey, as a developing country, is experiencing nearly all of the above 
conditions. In the following chapters we will try to develop a monetary base control 
model taking into consideration the limitations mentioned above. 
So far, we explained the analytical grounds behind a monetary base control mech-
anism. In the following chapters, we will present the model constructed for this purpose. 
But first, we would like to demonstrate some characteristics of the Turkish economy. 
9 
CHAPTER II 
Instititional Framework for Monetary Policy in Turkey 
A. Monetary Authorities and Instititions 
1 . Central Bank 
After declaration of the Republic in 1923, one of the first steps taken by 
Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, toward an independent economy was the 
constitution of a Central Bank, distinct from the government body. Although it was 
initially intended that the Central Bank be autonomous, in practice, until 1970 the 
Bank was effectively under the control of the Ministry of Finance. In 1970, a new 
Law, 1 after a many-year passage through the National Assembly, brought a partial 
degree of independence to the Central Bank. It provided greater autonomy to the 
Bank in the exercise of its constituted responsibilities, the issuance of currency (ex-
cept coin issues), the determination of redicsount rates on commercial paper, in-
terest rate ceilings for the commercial banking sector and the reserve requirement 
ratios, the undertaking of open market operations, serving as the nation's foreign 
exchange reserve repository, and the determination of foreign exchange rates. In 
addition, the Bank was empowered to regulate the terms of consumer credit and pri-
vate sector bond issues. However, the central banks cannot engage in some transac-
tions; it cannot provide any direct credit to the individuals, it cannot accept deposits 
from individuals, and it cannot rediscount Treasury short-term bonds. 
1 Law No. 1211, Publication in "Official Gazette" of Turkey, 1.12, 1970. 
10 
SEE's more on the basis of pragmatism and expediency than on the basis of any 
doctrine, although it was influenced by the 1930's experiences of State Capitalism. 3 
SEE's operate in manufucturing, transportation, mining, storage and sales of major 
agricultural products, and in the form of specialized public financial institutions. 
Until the early 1960's, the growth of the SEE's was substantia l and was supported 
by large government subsidies to compensate for deficits incurred through artificial 
price ceilings and managerial inefficiency. Following the 1960 militar y couo d 'etat, the 
Government ordered an investigation which resulted in a new organization which 
brought the SEE's under stricter Treasury control. The new Laws 
4 
established the 
State Investment Bank to supply long-term investment funds to the SEE's and effected 
reorganization intended to raise their productivity and stimulate internal savings. 
Most of the outstanding debts of the SEE's were already consolidated in 
1961. 5 The new system a lso severely restricted SEE access to new direct credits 
from the Central Bank. These credits were limited to SEE's dealing in support pur-
chase of surplus crops and manufacturing of agricultural products. All other credits 
to the SEE's must now be obtained through the Treasury. 
B. Stability of Prices and Financial Institutions 
1. Prices 
The domestic currency in Turkey is the "lira" whose value (at the end of 
3Wor ld Bank Report: Turkey, Prospects and Problems of an Expanding 
Economy, Washington, D. C., February, 1975, p , 73. 
4Law 440 and 441 which reolace Law 3460. 
5Law 154, in 1961. 
12 
1974) equals 1 Turkish Lira (TL)= $. 066 (approximately) or $1 = TL 15 (approxi-
mately). In 1946, this value was determined as $1 = TL 2 , 80. But price increases 
averaging 10% a year, during the period 1950-60 led to a 68. 9% devaluation in 1958-
1960 (in two steps) and another 40. 0% devaluation in 1970. In the 1960-1970 period, 
average price increases were about 6%. However, this low rate was obtained by 
contro lling the prices of basic products produced by SEE's. Transportation, fuel, 
electricity and basic foods were among those controlled commodities. The huge 
deficits incurred by these institutions were paid by the Treasury having recourse 
Central Bank resources. The accumulated effect of this policy resulted in a 14% 
price change in 1970. However, in that year, some other factors contributed to this 
development. For instance, the Law which brought as much as 100 % increase in 
government employees' salaries passed the National Assembly that year. This in 
turn encouraged private sector employees to strike for wage increases. Also, 
carryover agricultural surpluses caused by good weather conditions in previous years, 
and the devaluation which resulted in increased remittances from Turkish workers in 
Europe whose numbers had been sharply increas ing both contributed to acce ler a ting 
inflation after 1970. Price increases accelerated to about 20% in 1973 and 1974 in 
terms of GNP deflator. Then, the need for the control of inflation was recognized 
to be urgent, "in order to protect the benefits of rapid growth and balance of payment 
improvement in recent years. 116 
6 
World Bank Report, p. 19. 
13 
2. Interest Rates 
In Turkey, most interest rates charged by licensed credit institutions 
are under strict official control of the Government. To give an idea of the course 
of regulated interest rates Table 1 was prepared. 
Table 1 
Interest Rates in Turkey 
(1961, 1970) 
Credits 
Ordinary and open er. 
Agricultural, export financing, artisans 
a nd small traders (the last two through 
the People's Bank) 
Medium and long-term credits of the 
Agricultural Bank 
Credits opened according to Act No. 
5389 by the Agricultura l Bank 
Deposits 
Sight - 4 months time (excluding saving 
deposits) 
Sight - 4 months time (only savings 
deposits) 
4 -6 months time 
6-12 months time 
12-18 months time 





















1 . 0 
3.0 




Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Summary of Money a nd 
Credit Statistics, 1968 and 1971 issues. 
14 
In practice, however, banks can easily evade these regulations by adding 
various transaction costs . In addition, it should be pointed out that the secondary 
unorganized money market in Turkey, which is beyond Government control, is 
estimated to be of considerable size and importance. 
Interest rates in these markets are even higher than those charged by licensed 
institutions including transactions costs. According to a 1972 study by Fry, "there 
have been reports that loans for construction in the Capital, Ankara, stand at around 
70 %. Much higher rates in rural areas have been reported. 117 Real transactions 
costs and changes are difficult to measure, so that the difference between rates 
a ctually charged and market equilibrium rate is difficult to estimate , though it is 
fairly certain that the equilibrium rate is higher than that fixed by regulation. 
3. Credit System 
Given the regulated structure of the legitimate credit market in Turkey, 
and the specialized sectors in which they are primarily intended to serve, it would 
be difficult to say that credit is allocated according to objective criteria. Imperfect 
market and social conditions interpose themselves in the availability and distribution 
of financial resources. Practices such as preferential treatment of established 
customers are common. 
The Government attempts to allocate credits in conformity with develop-
ment and other objectives through the instrument of interest rate differentials and 
rebates to favored sectors. But it is not certain that credits given on this basis are 
1 s ed completely for their stated purposes. 
7Fry, op. cit., p. 114. 
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Central Bank rediscounts and credits to the commercial banking system 
are relatively low in volume relative to total credits. That means the banking sys-
tern relies more on its own resources. Even interest differentials on rediscounts 
and advances from Central Bank to priority sectors did not become an effective 
tool until recent years. But after 1970, with the acceleration of inflation a con-
siderable demand increase was observed. However, in general the Central Bank 
primarily finances the Government sector and SEE's. 
8 
The priority relationship 
between the Central Bank and Government-SEE's is the main reason for limited 
nature of Central Bank-commercial banking system relations. 
9 
4. Money and Security Markets 
Security markets are almost non-existent in Turkey. lO However, the total 
of the outstanding securities is relatively high. The private sector share is modest, 
and, until recent years, privately owned bonds ty0ically were not marketed. Most 
securities are government issues. But the short-coming of these securities is that 
they were sold and are held by savings-generating Government institutions (such 
as compulsory insurance companies, created by special laws), rather than by the 
public. Also, Banking Law requires that a certain percentage of the profits of the 
banks be used in purchasing government securities. So that, most of these securities 
could be thought as perpetual debt, as they usually are renewed at their maturities. 
8
state Planning Organization, The New Strategy for Development Plans, 
Third Five-Year (1973-77), Ankara, 1973, pp. 875-876. 
9Akguc, Oztin, Cumhuriyet Devrinde Bankacilik Alaninda Gelismeler (Develop-
ments in the Banking Sector After Independence), Banks Association of Turkey, Ankara , 
1975, p. 59. 
10world Bank Report, op. cit., p. 20. 
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To give an idea about the components of the internal debt and its developments 
Table 2 was prepared, 
Table 2 
Internal Public Debt, Selected Years 
(TL million; outstanding as of end-December) 
1963 
I. General Budget 3,672 --
1. Treasury Bills 344 
2, Treasury Placement Bonds 1 
187 
3. Long- term Government Bonds 737 
4. Domestic Consolidated Debts 2 7 0 036 
5. Consolidated Municipalities Debts3 
6. Savings Bonds 1,232 
7. Other Debts 4 136 
II. 
5 Annexed Budget - State Water-
works Bonds 20 
State Investment Bank Bonds 
6 
669 III. 
IV. State Economic Entr. 
7 573 
V. Municipal Bonds 96 
TOTAL 11. 030 
1 
Treasury 
2consolidated debts under Law 154 and 250 
3consolidated debts under Law 691 
1970 1971 
18,402 23. 190 
978 2,240 
2,818 3,238 






















4Exchange losses paid to the Central Bank under Law 65. 
5Treasury-guaranteed bond of State Highways and Monopoly Administration 
are excluded since they have a maturity of not more than a year. 
6Inc luding Amortization and Credit Fund Bonds 
7 Agriculture Bank, Real Estate and Credit Bank and People's Bank. 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Turkey and World Bank Report: Turkey, Prospects and 
Problems of an Expanding Economy, Washington, D. C., February 1975, p. 73. 
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As can be seen from the examination of Table 2, the only remarkable change 
in domestic debt took place in Treasury long-term bonds. For these bonds, espec-
ially after 1971-72 marketing efforts gave good results and the amount of 3,238 
million TL long-term bonds went up to 6,286 million TL. The distribution by owner-





Long-Term Government Bonds by Ownership 
(in million TL) 
Purchasers 
Private Public 
Total Issue Banks Companies Institutions 
4 000 1905.1 156.3 1298. 1 
Other 
640.5 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Turkey and World Bank Report: Turkey, Prospects 
and Problems of an Expanding Economy, Washington, D. C., February 1975, n. 399. 
With continuing marketing efforts, the amount of outstanding bonds could con-
tinuously be increased, and, this would certainly be useful in husbanding Central 
Bank resources in the short-run. 
5. Foreign Sector 
The foreign sector of Turkey, until the 1970 devaluation was characterized by 
a continuous shortage of foreign exchange reserves; exports did not increase, 
imports had to be financed with the continuous help of foreign aid. 1970 was a 
turning point in this situation. Suddenly prospering Turkish workers in Europe 
18 
affected the balance of payments figures in favor of Turkey through their remittances, 
at least until 1974. It is also said, however, that these remittances were involved 
in the acce lerating inflation of the early 1970's, through their impact on the money 
supp ly owing to the lack of proper sterilization measures. 
With these words, we have completed the general description of the Turkish 
economy for our purposes. In the next chapter, we will try to describe a monetary 
base model whose properties are appropriate to such an economy. 
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CHAPTER III 
A MONETARY BASE AND POLICY DETERMINATION 
ANALYSIS MODEL FOR TURKEY 
To this point we set the stage for a model to determine the monetary base 
for Turkey. In this chapter our purpose will be to form such a model for the Turkish 
e conomy . 
In doing so, first we will present the monetarist model, then, show the justi-
fication for using the monetary base in determining monetary policy, in Turkey. Here , 
our purpose is to employ the close relationship between nominal income, money 
supply and reserve money variations, implied by the monetarist pos ition. 
Then we wi 11 investigate the possibilities for the change in monetary re-
s erve s required by chosen µo licies, taking into consideration each item in the 
monetary reserves. In other words, we will try to demonstrate the degree of 
a utonomy and the limita tions of each item as a policy variable . 
A. Presentation of the Model 
1 
Following Polak and Argy, let us define: 
Y = v Ms (2) 
where Y == Money income, Ms == Money s upply . 
This equation represents the monetarist view in which money i s considered 
as the determinant of the nominal income, where (v) is the income velocity of 
1 
Polak, J. J. and Victor Argy, "Credit Policy and the Bala nce of Payments", 
International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers, Vol. 18, n. 2; See also, P o lak, J.J. 
"Monetary Ana lysis of Incom e For ma tion a nd Payments Problems ," International 
Monetary Fund, Staff P a pers, Vol. 6 , pp. 1~ 50; a nd P olak, J. J . a nd Lorette 
Boissonneault, "Monetar y Ana lysis of Inc ome a nd Imports and Its Statistica l Applica-
t ion, " Staff Papers, Vol. 7, op. 349-415 . 
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money demand (= sunply). But we know that, in turn , the money supply is a func-
tion of money multipliers, and changes in money supply can be exoressed as the 
changes in the monetary base and money multiplier. 
,0.Ms == .6.RE.~ +&. RE + LlliE.r 
where RE== R+D 





r == Estimated money multiplier, R == Foreign reserve assets 
RE == Reserve money, D == Domestic assets of Central Bank 
For Turkey's case net foreign reserves can be exoressed as: 
R == Rg - FL (6) 
where Rg == Gross foreign reserve assets 
FL== Foreign Liabilities 
Now suppose that domestic assets of the Central Bank can be expressed in 
the following composition: 
D == G + S + B + 0 + BA 
where G == G0 + T and 
T == Treasury short-term credit from Central Bank 
G0 == Other Government accounts at Central Bank 
B == C Laims on deposit money banks 
BA == Agricultural credit 
S == SEE's credit from Central Bank 
0 == Other accounts in Central Bank 
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(7) 
Also assume that in reserve money equation (4), R is ,exogenously deter-
mined and has the following implicit form: 
R == f (X, K, M) (8) 
where X == Exports, K = Capital movements, M = Imports 
Further, let B, commercial banking credits from Central Bank be deter-
mined elsewhere in the system and it is a function of certain specified variables such as 
production level, price exoectations, rediscount rate of Central Bank, etc. 
B = g (y, (p/ot, i) (9) 
where y == Production in real terms, 
(p/o )e == Price change expectations, 
i = Nominal rediscount interest rate of Central Bank 
Then the equation (5) can be expressed as: 
.6RE = L\(f(X,K,M)) + L\(G0 +T+S+O+BA+g(y, (p/p)e,i)) (10) 
If we define the exogenously determined variables as E, this will have the 
following form: 
E = ((f(X , K,M) )+g(y, (p/n)e, i))+G0 (11) 
where E = Exogenously determined variables in reserve money 
Our policy variable, PO which shows the ability of the Central Bank to 
manipulate its assets is defined to be: 
.6RE = L\E + L\PO (12) 
or 
L\PO = - L\E + .6RE (13) 
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Substitute (11) into (13) to get: 
Af>0=.6.RE-.6.(f(X,K, M)+g(y, (P/n)e, i)+G0 ) (14) 
The equation (14) expresses the size of the control of the Central Bank 
over its asset changes. 




= RE * 
" where r == Estimated money multiplier 
RE * is the required reserve money. 
(15) 
To implement the policy, the monetary authority should calculate the re-
quired (desired) change in the monetary base: 
RE* - RE = .6.RE * where RE *> E (16) 
But we know that some changes would happen autonomously or determined 
e ls ewhere in the economy . Then: 
.6.RE * = .6.E + .6.PO * or 
.6..PO * = .6.RE * - .6.E 
(17) 
(18) 
is the desired policy size which could be implemented through the changes 
in asset holdings of the Central Bank. 
Now let us follow the implications of the model for Turkey's case. 
B. Steps Toward a Policy Determination 
1 . A Decision Process 
As we stated before, a policy action requires us to take a series of steps . 
First, monetary authorities should be able to translate the longer term objectives 
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of the economy into short term movements. That means, they should estimate 
what the current situation implies about balance of payments, future prices, em-
nloyment in the future, etc. Secondly, we need to ask, what should be the changes 
in current variables necessary to reach the desired future values of the economic 
aggregates. Later, the analysis of current situation comes into the picture. What 
are the changes from the previous period and what are the reasons for those 
changes? 
Now the size of the desired changes and autonomous changes are estimated. 
After subtraction of the anticipated autonomous changes which would depend more 
or less on their time paths, the required policy to reach the desired change in 
economic aggregate is ready to be implemented, through the policy- s ensitive varia -
bles. Let us follow the implication of these steps for our monetary base analysis 
and control model for Turkey. 
2. Monetary Base, Money , Income Relations 
To be able to say that control of the reserve money leads to the control of 
income, it has to be shown that the income and money supply (== money demand) 
r e lation is a stable one. Further , a stable (or "definable") relations hip between 
reserve money and money supply should be demonstrated. 
Money supply nominal income relationship can be expressed as equations 
(19) and (20) below. The coefficients of income, (Y) in the equations explain the 
effects of the unit Y change on money supply (Ms). That is, money demanded for 
unit income change (with the assumption MS == Md) is equal to Y. In es timations 
s tandard M\ and Ms2 definitions for Turkey are used. 
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LogMs1/P == -.341 + .4371 Logy 
(-.107) (1. 40) 
with R 2 == .131 and D. W. == . 8842 
and 
Log Ms 2/P == -.321 + .4652 Logy 
(-. 088) (1. 30) 
with R 2 == . 115 and D. W. == . 7167 
(19) 
== . 763 
(20) 
' == . 859 
Equation (19) and (20) implies that for one unit change in real income we 
should increase money supply (M1 sense) .4371 times and (M2 sense) .4652 times. 
In making comments on these figures, data unavailability, definitions problems for 
Turkey and the excluded variables (that is, i and p/p effects) should be considered.. 
2 
After these observations, money supply and monetary base relationship 





) relations are shown. 
If we define monetary base 
3 
in form of: 
RE== m (DD+ DDg) + u (PTDR) DD+ PAR (DD)+ DERP(DD) (21) 
where m == Reserve ratio on demand deposits, 
DD == Demand deposits, 
2
In Aydin, Dr. Izzet, Para Politikasinin Teorik Yonu ve Analiz Modeli 
(Theoretical Aspects of the Monetary Policy and a Model to Analyze Turkish System), 
Ankara 1970, pp. 105-106, these elasticities are estimated as for M1, 0.9613 and 
for M2, 1.073. Fry, Maxwell J., Finance and Development Planning in Turkey, 
E. J. Brill (Leiden), 1972, in pp. 92-101, found close relationships between money 
and income, working with various definitions of money and lags. Considering the 
recent studies which report the real income elasticity at the neighborhood of . 6, our 
estimates should be taken as statistically significant. The reason for a low Durbin-
Watson statistic (even after adjustment for serial correlation) may well be a result of 
a non-linear or more than one period lagged error term. 
3For the derivation of this see: Boorman, John T. and Thomas Havrilesky, 




Money Multipliers for Turkey 
(1959 - 19.74) 
Years For M1 For Mz 
1959 2.09 1. 96 
1960 2.09 1. 92 
1961 2.13 1.92 
1962 2.11 1. 90 
1963 2.19 1. 94 
1964 2.17 1. 92 
1965 2.23 1. 92 
1966 2.36 1.99 
1967 2.37 1. 99 
1968 2.43 2.01 
1969 2.51 2.07 
1970 2.69 2.14 
1971 2.52 1. 93 
1972 2.36 1. 76 
1973 2,29 1. 77 
1974 2,22 1. 74 
Source: Prepared from Internationa l Monetary Fund, International 
Financia 1 Statistics, Turkey Section, various issues. 
2G 
DDg == Government deposits at commercial banks, 
u == Reserve ratio on time deposits , 
g == Reserve ratio for government deposits, 
PTDR == Preferred Time Deposit Ratio or time deposit/demand deposits, 
PAR == Preferred Asset Ratio or currency/demand deposits, 
DERP - Desired Excess Reserve Preference Ratio, 
and O < r, u < l; O < PAR, PTDR, DERP. 
Then for M1 , we have: 
s l+PAR ) RE 
M 1 == ( m(l+g)+u(PTDR)+PAR+DERP 
and for M2 
s l+PAR+u(PTDR) 
M 2 == ( m(l+g)+u(PTDR)+PAR+DERP ) RE 
(22) 
(23) 
Here the coefficients of RE are the money multipliers. 
Table 4 displays more stable relationship for M2 definiton for implicit 
money multipliers while Mi shows more fluctuating behavior. Change in any of 
the determinants of the multipliers (such as legal reserve requirements on demand 
deposits or time deposits or currency preference ratio change) will affect the value 
of the multipliers. Also it can be shown
4 
that these variables can be exoressed in 
the form of behavioral equations. Then, we may conclude that the changes observed 
in money multipliers are the result of some definable relationships and most of them 
4 
Boorman, Ha vrilesky, op. cit., pp. 31-33. 
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(such as the ratio of legal reserve requirements) are under monetary authorities' 
control. Note that any change in multiplier will bring a non-discriminatory pressure 
on the money supply and credit expansion. That is, a general contractionary pressure 
which may not be desirable. 5 As a result changes in the values of money multipliers 
are quite predictable. It follows from what we have said so far, that if we can control 
the monetary base, through certain parameters we can control the money supply which 
in turn would lead to the control of nominal income. However, the limitations should 
be noted; the unstability in money multipliers may imply that either we have insufficient 
data or the monetarist model is not appropriate, or structural changes may have 
occurred in Turkey. 
But which part of the monetary base is more feasible for policy actions? 
According to the findings reported below in Table 5 the policies exerciesed on mone-
tary base "uses" are offset by the changes in income velocity of money supply while 
changes in the base cause the changes in nominal income. In our estimation, we have 
found that, both for Ms 1 and Ms 2 
definitions, the equations, that is, Y == v. Ms; 
Ms == r .RE; y == d.RE, (corrected for autocorrelation) show that variations in income 
velocity are greater than the variation in the income/reserve money ratio, that is 
the product of velocity times the money multiplier. Meanwhile, money multipliers 
are more stable. The results are given in Table 5. 
Table 5 







Source: Calculated using IMF International Financial Statistics, 1959-1974 . 
5For an analysis of money multipliers for Turkey also see: Fry, op. cit., pp. 83-89. 
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These results imply that efforts to apply the policies to the "use" of 
monetary base (such as increases or decreases in legal reserve requirements) 
cause velocity to fluctuate inversely with the money multiplier which in turn can 
be considered as changes in the money supply in a direction contrary to that in-
tended by policy. In Table 5, the variance of Y/RE is the variance of the combined 
effect of the velocity (Y/Ms1 or Y/Ms2) and the implicit money multipliers (Ms1/RE 
or Ms2/RE). The variance of Y/RE expresses the squared deviations from the 
mean value of Y/RE. Variances of velocity, on the other hand, represent devia-
tions from mean of Y/MS1 or Y/Ms2 . When a policy tool related to the money 
multiplier is employed, it means that the intention is to change M~ /RE or M~/RE 
(depending on the definition). For this policy to be effective, either velocity would 
have to be constant or would have to change in the same direction as the money 
multiplier ; otherwise, as for example when the authorities attempt to decrease the 
value of the money multioliers, if velocity increases, then the resulting effect would 
be to end up with a smaller change in the money supply than was desired. If this 
were not the case, that i s, if velocity were either constant or changing in the same 
direction as the money multipliers, the variance of the product of these two para-
meters (that is Y/RE) would fluctuate, at least as much as the product of the individual 
variations taken separately. Thus, what follows logically is that, if the volatility of 
Y/RE is smaller than velocity variations, the velocity and money multipliers do not 
change in the same direction; in other words they interact in the opposite direction, 
offsetting each others' variations, keeping the product of velocity and the money 
multiplier relatively constant. 
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For this reason, we suggest direct monetary base controls, that is, 
control of "sources'' rather than "uses" of reserve money. 
If all these observations are true, then the question becomes, given the 
estimated money multiplier, how can we control the sources of the monetary base. 
This problem can be considered in a money stock adjustment form. First, we 
should know the desired money stock, then subtracting this from existing stock, 
we can get the required change in stock. Since monetary base and money supply 
relationships are assumed to be defined, we may calculate the required reserve 
changes. 
3. Availability of the Data and Speed of Adjustment 
To explain the speed of the adjustment requires the information about how 
soon the institutions could react and how soon the data would become available. 
The "use of reserve money," if we would recall, consists of bank re-
serves and public currency holdings. Public currency holdings and the currency 
in the bank reserves, in other words "currency in circulation" data, is available 
daily; since the currency issuing main institution is the Central Bank, daily com-
puter printouts give the result (and Treasury coin issues should be added to this 
figure). But the calculation of the bank reserves requires more time, since we do 
not know the currency in deposit money banks. On the other hand the "sources" 
of the reserve money data is also available daily. All data are published weekly in 
the "Officia 1 Gazette of Turkey. " 
Speed of adjustment also depends on how soon the measures could be 
taken. If the required measure is a matter of a new Law or an amendment of a 
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Law, this may take at least months if not years or even decades. For this reason, 
the new Central Bank Law 
6 
enacted in 1970 gave the Central Bank broad flexi-
bility to alter the monetary aggregates. Also in recent years, Budget Laws may 
contain some articles related to the Central Bank operations. 
Even if the matter is already allowed under certain legislations, the imple-
mentation by Central Bank is not easy. The extent of intervention by the Government 
Agency, in general, depends on the size of the Central Bank operation. Intervention 
could be in both directions. However, in recent years, for some operations Central 
Bank has succeeded in reacting independently. So, timing in the defensive operation 
of the Central Bank both in the short-run and in the long-run depends on various but 
different factors and the reaction is uncertain. 
The "adjustment period" to be considered depends on the trade-off between 
the predictability of different length multipliers and whatever the accepted re-
lationship between the money stock and the economy is. 
7 
However, the best control 
period is still debatable and varies from daily to quarterly control. 
8 
Too short 
periods are clearly irrelevant, the proper length depends upon the lags between money 
and income. In Turkey, since the related data can be obtained only with a considerable 
lag, the control period may not be less than one quarter. 
6 
Law No. 1211. 
7
Kalish, L., "A Study of Money Stock Control" , Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis, working paper: 11, 1974, p. 5. 
8 
Meltzer, op. cit., p. 20. 
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C. Sensitivity of Reserve Money and Its Components to Policies 
Now, suppose the monetary authorities estimated the desired change in 
the money supply , estimated money multipliers and translated 9 the desired 
change of the money supply in the monetary base form. There are certain 
variables in the reserve money comnonents that grow over time autonomously. 
Monetary authorities cannot influence them in the short-run or in a monetary ad-
justment period. Naturally, Like all the other variables, they can be affected in 
the Long-run. But our emphasis here is mostly on the _short-run. So, the desired 
change in the base Less the autonomous change .will give the possible size of change 
of the desired monetary policy variable. 
The model constructed for this work uses the concepts shown in Table 6 
in the calculation of reserve money for Turkey. Let us examine the meaning and 
the coverage of these items in the following sections. 
This table is prepared using only Central Bank accounts, Treasury coin 
10 It . issues, and Treasury "International Monetary Fund advances" accounts. 1s 
not a complete reserve money as defined in Chapter 1, since it does not contain all 
Treasury debt accounts (either short-term or long-term) and Treasury cash situa-
tions, but the definition used by IMF is the one used here. 
9 
Here, it should be noted that the money supply may also be affected by 
changes in the deposit/currency ratio and changes in the Liquidity ratio. But these 
effects are, in general, long-run effects. Furthermore, their estimates for Turkey 
have been found very small. For this reason we ignore more detailed analysis here. 
For more on this point see: Fry, op. cit., pp. 79-80, 83-88. 
lOHereafter, International Monetary Fund will be mentioned as IMF. 
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Table 6 
Reserve Money Sources and Uses (Turkey's Case) 
Sources 
Foreign Assets 
Claims on Government 
Claims on SEE's 
Claims on Deposit Money Banks 
(-) Foreign Liabilities 
(-) Government Deposits at the 
Central Bank 
~ Other Items (Balancing Item) 
Uses 
Bank Reserves 
Public Currency Holdings 
Source: Prepared, using Central Bank of Turkey Reports 
and data published by the Turkish Government. 
d bl. . 11 d The ata used is obtained from IMF pu 1cations an is shown in Appendix 
Table 1. This data is, in turn, used in obtaining nannual data" which consists of 
the averages of the four quarters for "stock 11 figures and the sum of the quarterly 
data for 11flow" figures (Appendix Table 6). 
Both quarterly and annual data are then used to obtain the shares of their 
respective components (Appendix Tables 2 and 7). 
Later, in Appendix Table 3 and 8, we show the absolute one-period 
changes in variables calculated for quarterly and annual data, respectively. Per-
centage changes appear in Appendix Tables 4 and 9 for quarterly and annual 
data respectively. 
The breakdown of the one-period changes in terms of changes in com-
ponents are shown in the Appendix Tables 5 and 10 for quarterly and annual data. 
11 
IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues, 1959-1975, 
Turkey Sections; Washington, D. C. 
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Finally, in Appendix Table 11, growth rates or time trends of the vari-
ables are calculated according to the equation (except foreign assets). 
LogX == LogC+Log(egt) 




where X == The variable whose gTowth rate is to be calculated; 
C == a constant which shows the intercept or average growth; 
g == growth rate, 
t == time. 
For foreign reserves, equation (26) has the form: 
Now, we are ready to analyze the role of reserve money components . 
1. Foreign Reserves 
By definition, foreign reserves equal foreign assets less foreign 
liabi lities. Under "foreign asset, 11 "convertible" and 11non-convertible 11 foreign 
reserves and go ld holdings are reported. Under "foreign liabilities'', the coverage 
of the figures is not clear. The item appears in IMF statistics under the heading 
"foreign reserve creditors" and gives the amount of "convertible" foreign ex-
change credits (apparently only from non-citizens and short-run). On the other 
hand , another item, called "other accounts" gives a substantial amount of foreign 
exchange credit figures, which indicates that the real foreign exchange reserve 
s ituation is, in fact, different from what is stated. In this case, although reserve 
money figures would cover the contribution of the foreign sector as the algebraic 
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sum of foreign assets, foreign liabilities and "a part of other accounts", since 
we don't know how much "other accounts" arises from the foreign sector, the 
"foreign sector" contribution to reserve money figures which appears in our work 
do not represent the foreign sector in the conventiona 1 sense. Rather, these figures 
cou ld be taken as a proxy for the "gold and convertib le foreign exchange situation 
which resulted from non-citizens activities, for short-term ana lysis purposes." 
For this reason we have preferred to examine foreign asset behavior only. 
The trend equation estimated (for quarterly data) is: 
Log R = 4. 77 + . 060t - . 0024t2 + . 000036t3 + l.110D 1 (28) 
(41. 8) (3. 54) (3. 75) (5.19) (7. 55) 
where R 2 = . 958 and D1= dummy variable for 1970 devaluation 
differentia 1 effect, D. W. = . 8177 
R == Foreign reserve assets, t = time. 
For annua 1 data the result is: 
Log R = 4.56 + .356t - .057t2 + .0030t3 + .938D J (29) 
(24.79) (3.11) (3.15) (4.02) (3.37) 
with R 2 = . 971 D. W. = 1. 81 
Then, what follows from this result is that foreign reserve accumulation, 
due to various reasons, follows an oscillatory path. And devaluations have an 
impact which can be explained by the change of intercept (or average foreign re-
serve accumulation rate). Obviously these changes are exogenous to the monetary 
a uthorities. However, the monetary authority can change the domestic price of 
foreign reserve assets and, as we have shown, this may have an effect on average 
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accumulation. That is, by changing the ratio of foreign currency to domestic 
currency , the government may have an instantenous gain or loss (r evaluation 
a nd devaluation respectively) when foreign assets at the Central Bank are evaluated 
a t the new price. 
Besides this, alteration of foreign asset prices will have an impact on the 
a ccumulation of reserves. The accumulation behavior would depend on export 
earnings, capital movements (that is, inflow or outflow) and expenditures on import 
g oods a nd services. These three variables in turn can be expressed in terms of 
their respective determinants. For short-run a nalysis, we consider these variables 
12 
as e xogenously determined to the monetary system. Polak-Argy argue that im-
ports are rela ted to income through the marginal propensity to import, which, in 
turn, a llows them to consider this variable endogenously determined through the 
money supply (or monetary base changes), and consider reserve accumulation as 
endogenous to the s ystem. 
Our estima tions in Appendix Table 12 d id not s unpor t this point a nd for the 
s hor t - run we could not fi nd a stable r elationship between imQor ts and income. Also 
- ' 
us ing annua! data , one-per i_9d lag estima tions do not imply a satistactor ily s tab le 1-~e-
lationship among the imports and the variables cited above. The rea son for this 
m ay well be due to import restrictions which are subject to instantaneous change/
3 
12 
Polak-Argy , op. cit., p. 3. 
13Moreover, Polak-Argy (op. cit., p. 6) accept tha t their model which in-
cludes endogenuous import equation "should really give worse results for developing 
countries. " And they continue "but this grea ter variability is due to reasons that are 
difficult to incorpora te in models, e.g. (for imports) greater variability in the use of 
controls and duties . " 
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In the long-run a certain relationship between imports and income may be defined. 
But for a system characterized by frequently changing restrictions and incentives 
(which is more relevant to Turkey), it is better to approach imports and exports as 
given by the restrictions and incentives package. So that we formulate the short-
run behavior by the implicit form: 
R == f (X,K,M) 
where R == Foreign exchange :reserves, 
X == Capital movements, 
M == Imports 
(30) 
Having specified the behavioral equations, we should address the question 
of how the nnnetary authority (in Turkey's case the Central Bank and in the case 
larger operations the Central Bank in conjunction with other decision-making 
Government Agencies) would react to the impact of foreign reserves on reserve 
money. This problem is the issue of sterilization (neutralization) and desteriliza-
tion of capital inflows and outflows. At this point note that the major problem in the 
14 
short-run is to restrain the increase of the money supply. Sterilization (in the 
case of a devaluation) can be thought of either as restraining· the effects of all 
additional foreign reserve inflows on the domestic money supply, or as limiting the 
multiple effects of the increment to foreign reserve accumulations on the money supply 
through controls over bank reserves (partial sterilization). Note that the latter case 
14Although from time to time, it may be required to increase reserve money, 
there are more ways than needed to do this. There, the problem may be the choice 
of instrument. But, since the major problem is to 11restrain11 the increase, emphasis 
here is given to that point. 
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allows foreign reserves (although to a smaller extent than other forms of the 
monetary base) to contribute to the money supply through currency and deposit 
changes, whereas complete sterilization assumes no increase in the money supply 
and could be considered as an alternative to the revaluation of the domestic currency. 
Since devaluation in general causes increases in domestic prices, an up-
ward pressure on credit expansion (otherwise on nominal interest rates) should be 
expected. In such cases, the monetary authorities, holding other central bank 
credit sources fairly constant, as an alternative might permit capital inflow in res-
ponse to the expansionary pressures. In terms of domestic currency the capital 
inflow may be two forms: increases in currency in circulation, and/or increases 
in bank reserves, that is, changes in deposits less required legal reserves. Public 
currency holdings add themselves to the money supply, whereas the contributions 
of the changes in bank reserves are magnified by the money multipliers. In this 
case, what is undesirable is the "multiple" effect of the changes in the bank reserves. 
A theoretically possible solution could be to set the money multiplier equal to one. 
This can be implemented by changing the determinants of the money multiplier to 
give the desired result . Among other possibilities, there is one effective tool. 
This is to fix the reserve requirement on capital inflows equal to 100 % or close to 
it. But such an approach would have three major drawbacks i n Turkey's case: 
a. When the Government imposes such a deposit requirement on the 
banking system, it has to reimburse the interest paid by the commercial bank sys-
tem to its depositors, which implies an interest payment on domestic money created 
by foreign reserve accumulation which would possibly be financed by a n increase in 
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government credit from the central bank. 
b. The second drawback is that the income velocity would have to remain 
fair ly constant during this sterilization operation. Otherwise, with upward changes 
in velocity, the restrained money supply "effect" would be compensated. As we 
mentioned above, these fluctuations in ve locity are like ly to happen in Turkey. 
c. Third, since the source of deposits cannot be identified (except 11con-
vertib le lira accounts") at the moment of deposit; a certain time period and calcula-
tions would be required to estimate the share of foreign reserve increases in the 
changes of deposits. Besides this, a delayed action varying reserve requirements 
could not discriminate by origin of the deposits. But discrimination in terms of 
the maturity of deposits is certainly possible. In the case of the so-called "con-
vertible lira accounts," which are the foreign reserve deposi ts denominated in 
domestic currency, 100 % reserve requirements may be app lied provided that in-
terest is paid by the central bank. Such a measure would mean the use of the 
commercial banking system as an intermediary in collecting foreign reserve de-
posits at the Central Bank. In this case, since money multiplier is equal to one for 
these deposits, there is once-for-all increase in money supply equal to the amount 
of the deposits. 
Up to this point, we have examined sterilization possibilities through the 
"use" of the reserve money. There are a lso some possible measures which can 
be applied to reserve money sources. 
One possibility is to speed up imports which are already queued or to 
pay back the foreign liabilities with relatively higher terms more quickly. 
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Another measure which could lead to sterilization is suggested by the 
15 
World Bank Report: to allow the banks to invest freely abroad and to repatriate 
investment . The World Bank also contributes another suggestion: to keep the re-
serves at reasonable level, Central Bank could extend some investment credits 
(medium-term) to the investment banks in Turkey. Although legally it is easy to 
decide to adopt these measures, we think, first, the Central Bank should have a 
good e stimate of the future inflow of foreign reserves. Second the investment 
credits suggestion requires that some additional investment projects be kept ready 
by the beneficiaries; this does not seem to us very likely to happen. Revaluation 
of domestic currency which may cause the capital outflow is not considered a suit-
able measure because of the effects on exportation. 
Other policy measures not directly related to the foreign reserve inflow (or 
a ny mix of s uc h mea sures ) may be applied . For insta nce, the for eii n exchange consia er ed 
"excess " may be inves ted in gold or some asset which pays a positive r etur n in inter -
nationa l m oney mar kets , a nd bonds indexed by the va lue of such gold holdings could be 
s old in domestic marke ts wi th t he gover nment paying a minimum nominal i nter est. _$ucb 
a measure woula r equir e the gover nment to assume financial r esponsibility for down-
ward or ice movements of gold , but since gold is a common means of holding wea lth i n 
Turkey, ther e would be a good cha nce that these gold cer tificates denominated in 
domestic curr enc y would be willing ly held by the Public. 
But we should recognize that all individual sterilization measures have 
limited power when they are used alone, and in general the situation requires the 
use of some mix of these measures. 
15world Bank Report, op. cit., p. 52. 
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In the early 1970's in Turkey, it was not possible to conduct an adequate 
sterilization, which caused a huge foreign reserve accumulation. Although, for 
future analytical purposes foreign reserve accumulation may be taken as subject to 
policy control, for the period of our analysis, accumulation, net of sterilization, 
is taken as exogenously determined in the monetary adjustment period. 
2. Government Liabilities to the Central Bank 
Claims on government includes Central Bank government bond holdings, 
short-term advances to the Treasury, so-called "accounts to be liquidated" and 
Treasury coin issues . 
Government bonds are issued in various forms; some are long-term 
bonds issued in accordance with some special legislation to finance some govern-
ment activities such as highway construction or waterworks. Usually, in these 
cases, the issuing agency is not the Treasury but the beneficiar y agency; the 
Treasury guarantees the interest and repayment, however. Some other forms of 
short-term government bonds are issued by the Treasury to obtain liquidity. 
Although these types of bonds are not discountable at the Central Bank when pre-
sented by the Treasury, rediscounting through a financial intermediary (usually a 
commercial bank) was possible 
16 
until 1970. 
The third kind of Government bond is issued to finance the tobacco crop 
which is one of the main agricultural products of Turkey. The purchase of the crop 
16But, "(there were) some considerable difficulties both in rediscounting 
them and in cashing them on maturity. The Central Bank has been known in numerous 
instances simply to say that cash is not available at the present time for such transac-
tions and that the bills must be held for another week or longer" (Fry, oo. cit., p. 143). 
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is completely guaranteed by the Government, The minimum price also is fixed by 
the Government. Usually the Government-determined price includes a subsidy and 
requires that the purchasing agency (for instance State Monopolies Directory) be 
financed . In this case , the purchasing agency issues Government bonds to the 
Cm tral Bank with a "Treasury guarantee . 11 This bond issue is limited to a certain 
percentage of the capita l and reserves of the purchasing agency. After this limit is 
e xceeded the Central Bank can no longer accept this form of government bond. In 
practice, since financing requirements are usually greater than the limit, short 
term Treasury advances are a lso used for this purpose. 
"Short-term advances to the Treasury" is a mechanism financing budget 
deficits. Each year, the Government can borrow up to 15 % of the current fiscal 
year budget allocations. And there is no need to repay this debt at the end of the 
year , even though the name suggests the contrary. In practice, since tax collections 
a r e generally overestimated and/or cannot be collected on time, this reserve is 
usually almost completely used up. 
The amount under the heading of "accounts to be liquidated II includes the 
11 consolidated 11 debts of some private firms, some commercial banks, some State 
Economic Enterprises taken over by the Treas ury, and the "consolidated" Treasury 
short-term advances. After this consolidation in the second quarter of 1961, some 
further consolidations of sma ller magnitude took place. But the importance of the 
1961 consolidation is that the annual payments by the Treasury to the Central Bank 
are continuously deferred by the Budget Laws. Meanwhile the amounts arising from 
the smaller consolidations are being repaid. As a matter of fact, this "Government 
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debt 11 for the last ten years has had a fixed value totaling 5270 million Turkish 
Lira. 
The data and various trends estimated are given in Appendix Tables 1-11. 
In addition to the calculations using the observed values, another version of the 
continuous trends was estimated. This was done by undoing the 1961/3 (consolida-
tion date) data and reassigning the quantities to their original sources. Central 
Bank reports show that the breakdown of the consolidation was in the following form 
(in 10 million Turkish Lira): 
Consolidated Total= Govt. Credit + SEE's + Private Co. 
527 = 228 +179 +120 (31) 
By adding the relevant amounts to the respective accounts, for the period 
after 1961/3, we get: 
GC == G - 299 
SC == S + 179 
BC = BT+ 120 
where GC == Government credit corrected for consolidation, 
G == Government credit from Central Bank, 
SC = SEE's credit corrected for consolidation, 
S == SEE's credit from Central Bank, 
BC = Commercial banking system credit corrected for consolidation , 
BT == Banking system credit from Central Bank. 
The new estimates of this form again are given in Apnendix Table 11. 
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Note that the new estimates also contain an important differential effect for 
the first quarter which includes the ends of fiscal years - - difficult periods for 
Turkish Governments. 
Now again the question is how do policy measures affect this variable? 
First, we should mention that the transfer of all government deposits to the Central 
Bank would be a contractionary measure, since the reserves of the banking system 
(actually reserves of one bank) would be reduced. 
The consolidated amount in 1961 is a "frozen'' account and each year, re-
payment is deferred by Budgets. Later consolidations are repaid. 
In 1970, with the new Central Bank Law, the purchase of short-term 
Treasury bonds by the Central Bank has been effectively restricted. (Recall that 
the major problem for Turkey is to restrain the growth of money supply rather than 
the reverse). 
Bonds of annex budgets (this item corresponds to the "State Monopolies" 
which is a Government Agency) have not changed for years, since the credit limit 
is fixed by law and a credit ceiling has already been reached. But to accept the fact 
that the "State Monopolies" are not getting Central Bank Credit is to underestimate 
the real situation. Some channels, perhaps the Treasury, continue to provide new 
credits, since the average purchase price and quantity have been continuously in-
. . t 17 creasing 1n recen years. 
17 
Average tobacco purchase price (relative to previous year) in 1971, 8. 3%, 
1972, 17. 3 %, 1973, 24. 6%, 1974, 74. 9%, increased. (Third Five-Year Development 
Plan, 1975 Programme, State Planning Organization, Ankara, 1945, p. 143). 
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The remaining item, which could be subject to policy intervention is 
the "short-term Treasury account." Although it is called that, it really shows the 
cumulated account and it therefore is a stock figure . Varying this account can be 
considered a policy variable. While in the Third Five-Year Development Plan, this 
18 
item seems to be considered as exogenous, the Wor Ld Bank report considers this 
. bl 19 stock figure completely as a policy vana e. We think, as we stated, that these 
changes are manageable (perhaps at a degree lower than 100%). The counter-cyclical 
policy could be either short-run bond sales by Treasury to the Public (or even to 
non-Governmental banks), or with good timing and ever-increasing stock figures, 
long-term bond sales can be resorted to. 
We can reasonably formulate the magnitude of a policy impact arising from 
11Government Liabilities to the Central Bank account" as: 
(33) 
where PO == Policy variable arising from "claims on government", g 
G0 = Government Liability accounts other than "Treasury short-
term" at Central Bank, 
T::::: Treasury short-term account. 
3. State Economic Enteroris_es Financed by Central Bank 
The figures under this heading represent the SEE' s financing for their 
economic activities. The manageria L deficits compensated by the Treasury are not 
18state Planning Organization, The New Strategy , pp . 876-877. 
19world Bank Report, op, cit., P, 112. 
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included here; neither is commercia l paper discounted by SEE's 
(arising from their economic activities as in the case of private companies) are 
not included here either . So that this item shows only some nart of inventory fi-
nancing of major agricultural products by the Government. (The remaining part of 
agr icultural financing by Government is agricultural credit which is included in the 
claims on deposit-money banks). 
Prices of most agricultural products which are financed by the Government 
are fixed by it each year, just before the purchase and harvest season begins. This 
implies that the absolute and percentage changes in these figures (see Appendix 
Tables 3 and 4, Co lumn 5) are determined by the level of prices fixed as we ll as 
by weather conditions in the past season. In other words, if weather conditions are 
good and prices are kept high (usually for political reasons such as in an e lection 
year, or right after a devaluation to extend the distribution of export gains to the 
furmers), the changes in SEE credit are greater and vice versa. The 1970/3 de-
va luation (1970/3 == forty-fourth observation) was such an instance. Also, increases 
in this type of credit occur mostly in the third quarter of the year, which illustrates 
the differential effect of newly determined prices which are out in the full, or at the 
encl of the summer. 
Although big price changes take place from time to time, this part of 
agr icultural sector credits at its r,eak (exc luding the oeriod prior to 1961/2) did 
not exceed about 15 % of total reserve money. (Fifth column of Appendix Table 2). 
Sometimes, however, a sharp increase in this form of credit, in spite of its small 
share, contributes largely in the year to year variations of total reserve money (such 
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as from 1963/3 to 1963/4; 1965/2 to 1965/3; 1967 /2 to 1967 /3; 1971/2 to 1971/3; 
1974/2 to 1974/3. In these quarters much of the total changes in the reserve money 
came from this type of SEE's credits (see Appendix Table 5). However, in the 
1972/2 -1 972/3, 1973/4-1974/1 changes, the situation was slightly different. Although 
abso lute changes were relatively large in size, since other forms of Central Bank 
credits were competing, these large changes did not lead to a big change in the share 
of this type of credit in total reserve money. 
In sum, this part of agricultural credit varies with weather conditions, 
government policies and prices. 
What can be said about policy? Changes in total SEE inventory financing 
in fact are the products of the changes in volume purchased (which in turn depends 
on a series of variables which can be summarized as weather conditions) and the 
nrice. So that changes in either variable affect the amount of credit. For this 
reason, the same amount of credit can be the product of the different set of price 
and weather conditions. Prices in general are inflexible downward. To give an 
idea for recent years Table 7 was prepared. 
However, the changes can be estimated approximately. Theoretically, 
the total amount is inventory financing, therefore it follows that after inventories 
are liquidated, the credit amount should be equal to zero. But this never happens. 
Part of this credit is already "frozen", as it contains a subsidy component. This 
can be calculated as the credit amount less the existing inventories in new year (or 
season). Under the assumption that there are no inventories left, the total 
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Table 7 
Important Agricultural Products Support-Price Changes 
(as percentage) 
Product 1971 1972 1973 1974 
1. Wheat 16.5 0.0 21. 2 75.0 
2. Cotton 19.6 10.6 59.3 34.5 
3. Hazelnut 13.3 0.0 19.1 39.2 
4. Seedless raisin 4.3 0.0 139.7 42.9 
5. Sunflower 11.1 10.0 13.6 50.0 
6. Rice o.o 11.1 44.0 25.0 
7. Sugar beets 0.0 0.0 50.0 33.3 
8. Tea 14.3 0.0 12.5 38. 9 
9. Tobacco 8.3 17.3 24.6 74.9 
Source: Third Five-Year Development Plan, 1975 Programme, 
State Planning Organization, Ankara, 1975, p. 143. 
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outstanding credit equals the llfrozen" part. If so, the change (that is, the difference 
between the estimated inventories at the new price and the total credit amount) is 
completely under Government contro l and can be considered as a policy variable. 
So: 
POs = .6.S (34) 
where POs = the size of the policy variable arising from SEE's financing 
4. Claims on Deposit Money Banks 
Under this heading, IMF figures give the total amount of the advances to 
the banks against foreign reserves or gold, credits against rediscounted private 
sector commercial paper and the capitalized debt of bank liquidation fund deficits. 
Also, a part of agricultura 1 credits extended against the required reserves deposited 
at the Central Bank are included in this category. 
Credits to the Agricultural Sales and Credit Cooperatives, since these 
institutions are considered a part of the private sector, are covered in the total 
private sector figures. These credits toAgricu ltura l Sales and Credit Cooperatives 
(in the form of commercial paper) have substantia l weights in the total claims on 
deposit money banks. 
Considering the fact that the prices of agricultural products are heavi ly 
regulated by the Government and the small resemblance these cooperatives bear to 
private enterprises, one can say that this form of presenting data on credits to 
the private sector (through the deposit money banks) is misleading. 
Except for the amounts previous to the 1962/2 consolidation, credits 
in general had the tendency to increase over time (See Appendix Tables 1-5 , sixth 
49 
columns). However, from time to time, small decreases (perhaps seasonal) could 
be observed. In most cases, these decreases were offset by compensated increases 
in the next quarters. But during the two major recessions in Turkey (1964-1965) 
and 1970/4-1971) that was not the case. Meanwhile it should be noted that, in Turkey, 
usually the banking system does not go to the Central Bank for credit unless the loan 
sought is eligible for preferential terms. Reluctance to have recourse to Central 
Bank rediscounts can be e:,,.rplained because higher profit margins are usually attain-
able by interna 1 financing. 
Under these circumstances, the banking sector credits from the Central 
Bank , on average compose only 15-20 % of the total reserve money (sixth column in 
Appendix Table 2). Note that during the periods in which the market price of the 
foreign currency has diverged from its official value, that is the periods prior to a 
devaluation (the length of the periods depending on the government's persistence) 
credit demands (although costly) increased their share of total reserve money (as in 
1967-1970/2) perhaps to finance import demands and speculation. 
After 1970/3 devaluation, credit demand (and supply) decreased sharply 
under the effect of Government credit controls and/or because of the "abundance" 
of foreign reserves (the foreign exchange necessary to cover import contracts was 
provided on demand) up to 1972/3. Later, sharp increases were observed. The 
reason for this is that, with the optimistic expectations with respect to the balance 
of payments, "convertible lira accounts" (which are deposits in foreign exchange) 
were allowed to be used as a source of credit; so that this foreign exchange credit 
in Turkish Lira added to claims on deposit money banks. Also note that the increases 
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in banking sector credit coincided with increases in the interest rate naid on 
time deposits. As these were increasing in cost, banks tended to seek more credits 
from the Central Bartle The third reason is that new measures were taken in the 
form of the provision of cheap Central Bank credit for export promotion. Of course, 
acceleration of inflation after 1970, also contributed to these developments . 
The trend estimates of quarterly and annual data are given in Appendix 
Table 11. Quarterly data estimates showing autocorrelation were corrected. But 
note that in the corrected estimates, the differential effect of Dl disappears. The 
test values of the yearly estimates are normal. 
Again the policy implications should be examined. In our estimations, 
part of the Central Bartl<: credit to the commercial banking system is assumed to be 
directed toward the agricultural sector (in actual calculation this part is assumed to 
be . 30 of the total). Same is true for changes in this credit. Then, we can treat the 
changes in this part like SEE's credit changes. Therefore, we may formulate the 
implicit form of the demand equation of this form of credit as: 
(35) 
where BT == Total claims on deposit money bartlrn, 
y == Real income; (p/p)e == Expectations about future price changes; 
i == Properly defined nominal interest rate. 
In other words, credit demand from the Central Bartl<: is a function of 
income, (y ), expectations about future prices (p/ p)e, and interest rates (i). 18 
18
Here, one of the difficulties is the definition and proper measurement of 
i. Indeed, State Planning Organization (['he New Strategy, p. 876) seems to accept 
that it 11should have a value greater than zero, but not known,"; on the other hand, 
(Footnote 18 continued at bottom of next page) 
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These variables in turn can be expressed in terms of appropriate proxies. Note 
that our analysis deals with the short run, consequently the more quickly available 
data is the better for policy determination. For price change expectations, current 
price changes may be used as proxies. Since in Turkey income or production data 
are essentially available annually, another proxy (such as excise tax records/ 9 
would be used for this variable for short run policy purposes. 
Since we assume that part of these credits (say, (d}) is going to the agricul-
tural sector and this part can be considered under government control, then it 
follows that: 
18 (Continued) 
World Bank Report (op. cit., p. 51) says that "role of interest rate in restraining 
the rapid growth in money supply is indirect, . but its allocative role is important." 
Further, Dorrance (op. cit., p. 278) accepts that nthe desires of the community 
to borrow are likely to be almost insatiable at any reasonable level of interest 
rates." Also Aydin (op. cit., p. 160) gives i elasticity of money supply as -.1241. 
But the test values of the estimates (such as D. W. == 1. 07) makes the estimate 
ques tionable. In fact, the channeling of credits to certain areas through the 
"interest change rebates 11 is proven to be effective in the µast. We do believe that a 
properly defined interest rate increase reduces the demand (and supply) of money; 
If it has a value different from zero, it may be used as a policy variable. 
19
Most developing countries levy taxes on production and imports in the 
form of excise taxes. This form of tax generates a relatively small number of tax 
declarations. Since in general these taxpayers are the relatively large firms of 
the country, they have good accounting systems. Tax corruption may be small . 
And g overnment usually has a reliable record on these tax collections. 
Furthermore, since major credit users and important industrial good pro-
ducers are usually the same, it follows that if any relationship between claims on 
banking sector credits from Central Bank and excise tax collections can be postu-




( 1-d) BT == B == (1-d) (g(y, (p/p)e, i)) (37) 
where BT== Total claims on commercial banking sector, 
B == Total claims on commercial banking sector less agricultural 
credit, 
POB == Size of policy related to this variable. 
In other words, we state that part of this variable can be considered endo-
genous (equation 37), while equation (36) shows "policy controllable" component. 
5 . Other Items 
The remaining assets and liabilities excluding reserve money uses and 
foreign liabilities in Table 6 are summed up in this variable. So, it contains capital 
accounts as well as unclassified assets such as buildings, etc. and unclassified 
liabilities such as provisions and convertible lira account liabilities . Since each 
of these items changes its definition over time, there is no clear-cut trend movement 
in "other items. 11 
Although we can 't really say more, lacking a more accurate breakdown of 
this account, our guess is that the convertible lira accounts have played a major role 
in determing the behavior of this account, especially in recent years. The values 
a nd changes of this variable are shown in Appendix Tables 1-10. 
Note that when this item has a positive net value it is adding to the monetary 
base; when it has a net negative va lue, it reduces the monetary base. Although we 
do not know its composition, as we stated, s ince it is a net value we accept the 
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proposition that all changes are adding to our 'policy" variable, assuming the risk of 
overestimating the "policy" variab le for this item. So: 
P00 == '6.0 (3 8) 
where P0
0 
= The size of policy arising from this variable. 
So far, we have explained how the Central Bank and other decision-maker 
Agencies could react to changes in monetary base sources. Now we would like to 
explore the possibilities for policy determination through the "use" side of the 
monetary base. 
6 . Public Currency Holdings 
This item shows the total currency in circulation (including coin issues by 
the Treasury) minus Treasury and banking system (including Central Bank) currency 
ho ldings. In other words, these figures are "effectively" circulating money. 
In general, it is steadily increasing. Results of the estimates show that 
there is a strong upward tendency during the third quarters in which crop purchases 
take place. 
Although in Turkey ~he Central Bank cannot directly change public 
currency holdings, the monetary authority (which consists of the Central Bank and 
other monetary decision-maker Agencies) can effectively do so by selling and pur-
chasing bonds. This point is also mentioned in the World Bank Report. 
20 
But 
a lthough it is correct, such measures require marketing efforts as we have said 
before. 
20 
World Bank Report, op. cit., p. 51. 
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7. Bank Reserves 
This item, as we mentioned above, shows bank reserves inc tuding their 
currency holdings. In quarterly estimates, we have significant decreases in the 
third quarters of the year in which agricultural crop purchases by private sector 
take place. 
The quarter ly, yearly, and the equations corrected for serial correlation 
are given in Appendix Table II, Quarterly and corrected for serial correlation 
yearly equations have the expected signs and test values. 
The variable, D7, indicates that in the post-devaluation period (1970) bank 
reserves did not increase immediately (as in the case of currency) . We may argue 
two reasons for this: first, tight money after the devaluation; second, lagging 
approximately one year after the devaluation price increases started to accelerate 
having a nominal increase effect on the bank reserves as well as currency holdings . 
One of the effective measures of monetary policy is to change the lega l 
reserve requirements to restrain the rate of growth of money and reduce its potential 
growth. This would cause an effect on the money multiplier in an opposite direction 
(if r equirements are increased, multipliers would decrease, or vice versa) without 
changing Central Bank assets. But in Turkey, effective application of this measure 
is difficult for, at least, two reasons: 
1. There are heavy pressures from different groups against a n increase 
in reserve requirements. 
2. The banks rather than rediscounting their commercial paper at the 
Central Bank, prefer to get advances against them. For this purpose, they deposit 
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their paper at the Central Bank. But, unless they use these advances, the value 
of this paper cannot be seen in the accounts. So, this is similar to a hidden cash 
reserve for the banks. When the legal requirements are increased part of the re-
quired reserves can be paid by entering this paper into the accounts. 
21 
The extent of the first difficulty is suggested by the World Bank: 
22 
(The increase in the reserve requirements) is likely to be less 
resented by the banking system if part of the sterilized reserves 
earn a reasonable interest which would bring them close to being 
an obligatory purchase of low-yield bonds. 
The second defect could be overcome by keeping the reserve requirement 
increases higher than those required by policy. 
A third difficulty may be added to these. The reserve requirement changes 
usually are effective in the next quarter. This may delay obtaining a fast result. 
This completes the reserve money components analysis from the standpoint 
of their use as policy variables in controlling the monetary base. Our policy variable 
is the sum of the individual policy variables which are, the policy variable arising 
from government liabilities to the Central Bank (POa), the policy variable arising from 
the SEE's liabilities to the Central Bank (POs), the policy variable arising from com-
mercial banking credits from the Central Bank (POB), and the policy variable arising 
from "other items" (P0
0
). To show their relative importance Table 8 was prepared. 
As it can be observed from the table, the policy variable arising from 
Government liabilities is the largest component of the complete policy variable. 
21 
See: Akguc, Oztin, op. cit., p. 59. 
22wor ld Bank Report, op. cit., p. 51. 
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Tab le 8 
The Magnitude of the Individua l Po licy Var iab les Re lati ve to the Toa l 
Changes in the Reserve Money, 1961-74 
(as percentage) * 
Policy Variables of the Mode l 
Year Banking Sys. 
Govt. L iab. 
Liabiliti es SEE 's Liab. Other Items 
1961 -2103 - 93 - 376 - 39 
1962 579 - 24 - 58 34 
1963 163 19 68 -107 
1964 225 6 14 36 
1 965 407 1 - .3 - 3 
1966 230 9 17 - 7 
1967 327 24 22 - 18 
1968 240 12 9 12 
1969 993 24 - 4 - 38 
1970 -14 18 - 1 - 24 
1971 497 - 6 25 - 74 
1972 85 - 3 13 -30 
1973 30 17 - 4 - 78 
1974 65 17 34 -24 
* If one would add the s um of the po licy var iab les to the exogenous ly 
de termined variab les, then the result would be equa l to 100. 
Source: Internationa l Monetary Fund , Internationa l Fina ncia l 
Stati stics, Turkey Sec tion, various issues. 
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At its peak in 1969, this variable changed as much as 933 % of the total reserve 
money changes. In 1961, because of consolidation, the Treasury credit from 
Central Bank, namely the "policy variable" arising from the "claims on govern-
ment" component of the reserve money, had a reducing effect on reserve money, 
since accumulated Treasury credit was transferred to the "other government lia-
bilities" account. In the same year, outstanding SEE loans and some of banking 
sec tor liabilities to the Central Bank were also consolidated. 
The "other items" component in general is relatively smaller in magni-
tude than the government policy variable, but it is still important. Note that when 
it has a negative sign, it "adds" to reserve money. The remaining two policy vari-
ab les, banking system liabilities and SEE credits have moderate shares in the total 
changes, even though their impacts in reserve money changes fluctuate widely. 





Up to this point, we have shown how to calculate the policy variable, PO. 
In this chapter we will discuss the use of the variable. 
Throughout we have assumed that the monetary authority has an absolute 
control over PO. But this may not be the case. With further investigation, it may be 
s "hown that the monetary authority's control over PO is in facto< PO where 0( :::_ l. 
If this is the case, that means the effective policy size iso(PO, rather than PO. 
The relationships between desired magnitude of policy (PO*) and available 
size of po licy (PO) may be of three types: 
1. PO* < PO, 
2. PO* > PO, 
3. PO* = PO. 
Leaving aside the third possibility, which has a small probability, Let us 
examine the other two: 
1. PO* < PO 
If the desired policy changes are smaller than what is attainab le to the 
monetary authority through PO, there are several choices, as we mentioned in the 
previous chapter. If the components of PO can be ordered in terms of certain 
extraneous priorities (e.g. , part of Treasury short-term advances were to be used, 
or a smaller subsidy to agriculture may still be desirable), then, these priorities 
can be incornorated in the determination of policy. The use of P O would, in any 
case, a lter the Central Bank-Treasury portfolio. 
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2. PO < PO * 
If the magnitude of the desired policy effect is bigger tha.n what is under con-
trol through PO, then the difference (PO* - PO) would have to be attained through 
other measures, since the limit to possible asset changes is assumed to be expressed 
in PO . In this case, the measures to be implemented would include changes in the 
value of money multipliers (such as changes in reserve requirements). Note that 
when indiscriminately applied, it restrains all forms of banking sector credits. 
This may not be desirable. Then, there is a possibility to use this tool discrimin-
1 
ately. Since changing the size of the money multipliers requires more precise 
information and estimation than is normally available, the probability of error is 
greater than is likely through direct monetary base control. Also it may take more 
time. Our suggestion is not to use this tool too frequently in Turkey's case. In spite 
of its effectiveness, it would be desirable to set the amount to be implemented 
thro ugh this variable at its minimum, that is equal to (PO* - PO). 
As we have explained before, Central Bank-Treasury asset changes for a 
policy nurpose may be implemented various ways. In selecting the tools a priority 
ordering can be prepared. For instance some sort of deficit financing exoenditures 
may still be desirable or measures such as revaluation may not be desirable, per-
hans because of possible destabilizing effects on the economy, etc. 
Ooen market or similar operations like the transfer of Government funds 
to the Central Bank, although desirable,may have a limited applicability under a 
1 
In 1976, the application in form of reduced reserve requirements for the 
deposits to be used for medium term credits has been successful in Turkey. 
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developing economy's conditions. The "excess liquidity" observed by Government 
could be demanded by the private sector. For a government which prefers not to 
use direct credit restrictions or rediscount rate increases, it may be the case 
that the competition between the Government and the private sector for "excess" 
funds may result in the government having to offer higher nominal interest rates 
on borrowings. In such periods, the government should first seriously consider 
reductions in its own borrowing from the Central Bank as an alternative policy. 
If the pressures originate from foreign reserve accumulation,and sterili-
zation policies are limited, then this should be taken as an opportunity to speed 
up repayment of foreign loans. Foreign reserve accumulation increases , among 
other things, import demand (maybe with a lag). Since most import goods in de-
ve loping countries are taxed (usually ad valorem) then increased import tax 
proceeds may be used in paying back these foreign debts with relatively higher 
terms. This would have an effect similar to sterilization. Sterilization or the 
simi lar resulting policies like routing new reserve funds to investments as much as 
possible may be applied. 
With these words we have completed the presentation of our analysis, con-
sidering Turkey's case. As in all models, we have abstracted from many real 
wor ld complications, yet the model strives to highlight certain essential relation-
ships which recommend its useful applicability. 
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CONCLUSION 
A monetary base analysis and control model has been the focus of this 
report. 
In the first chapter, the monetary base approach to the control of money 
is presented and the links between monetary base, money supply and money income 
are shown. Further, the monetary policy problems of the developing countries 
are reviewed. 
The second chapter describes the institutional framework for Turkey. 
Here, as background information, the Central Bank, the Treasury and the State 
Economic Enterprises are examined from a monetary policy viewpoint. Also the 
stability of prices, the credit system, interest rates, money and security markets 
and foreign sector developments in recent decades are summarized. 
In the third chapter, we have constituted a model which highlights the 
essentials of monetary base control. To justify monetary base sources control 
first we have examined the money income-money supply relationship; then, the 
relationship between the money supply and the monetary base is demons trated. As 
a r e sult, in Turkey 's case, we have found that efforts toward changes in the money 
multipliers, which can be attempted, among other ways, through changing legal 
reserve requirements, would be offset by changes in the income veloc ity of money. 
The n , given the re lative stability of the product of multipliers times velocity , the 
"direct" control of reserve money sources is suggested , and given the exogenously 
determined components of reserve money sources, the limits on the r a nge of 
de liberate Central Ba nk-Treasury asset changes , through excha nge r a te , r ediscount 
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rate, open market interventions, etc., are estimated. 
Foreign reserve accumulation (noting that endogeneity of imports as in the 
Polak-Argy model is not proven in our estimates on Turkey) and banking sector 
credits obtained from the Central Bank (which represent private sector demand from 
Central Bank)are taken as exogenous to the monetary authorities. But the balance 
of payment surpluses arising from the reevaluation of foreign assets after changes 
in the exchange rate are assumed to be under monetary authority's control. It is 
also argued that devaluations far below the equilibrium value of the domestic 
currency (under-valuation) result in potential inflationary pressures since they 
cannot be properly sterilized and/ or absorbed by the economy, so that this instru-
ment requires care in its use. 
The recommended use of the oolicy variable defined is explained in the last 
chapter. There the ways in which Central Bank-Treasury asset changes can be 
effected are described and found to include limited open market operations, manipu-
lation of government accounts, direct or indirect (fixing the rediscount rate) regu-
lation of Central Bank credit and changes in the foreign exchange rate. 
The problems of Turkey are similar to those of other developing countries 
in many aspects. There are similar tendencies for many variables, although each 
country has different characteristics, economic and social structures. It follows 
that remedies can be broadly similar although applications will differ from country 
to country. 
The outlined policies do not address themselves to the solution of all prob-
lems; however, the necessity for designing different policies fitting the special 
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conditions of each country and the need for other policies comp lementary to 
monetary policies is apparent. Our suggested so lutions should be considered 


























App e ndix Tab le I 
The Va lues of the Reserve Money and Its Comnonents Used in This Study (Quarterly Data) 
(In 10 Million Turkish Lira) 
Uses of 
Reserve 
Sources of Reserve Money Reserve Money 
Money Foreign Govt. Liab. SEEs Cred Bankinl Foreign Other Bank Currency 
Sector iab 
Reserves to Cen.Bk. to Cen. Bk. Ito C"'n "Rk. Lia bi ti ties Items (Net' Reserves in circuta. 
442 74 110 222 249 - 95 -11 8 101 341 
458 73 135 221 240 - 99 -112 103 355 
462 73 131 224 262 - 99 -1 29 102 360 
490 218 121 225 258 - 249 - 83 96 394 
513 227 161 190 283 - 218 -130 130 383 
514 206 182 182 264 -1 83 -137 114 400 
492 201 512 18 76 - 186 -1 29 93 399 
526 208 499 26 106 -1 86 -127 100 426 
554 213 517 20 89 -160 -125 140 414 
567 211 520 27 75 -137 -129 126 441 
541 204 515 15 83 -175 -101 110 431 
589 207 519 43 95 -1 83 - 92 122 467 
'601 196 544 36 110 -162 -123 148 453 
620 195 570 40 99 - 150 -134 148 472 
597 194 578 54 121 -1 83 -1 67 138 459 
621 192 585 67 152 -1 98 -1 77 143 478 
663 206 592 100 121 - 201 -1 55 170 493 
679 177 610 78 124 -176 -134 171 508 
671 179 622 60 123 -174 -139 161 510 
749 161 655 81 168 -187 -129 169 580 

























Appendix Tab le I (Continued) 
The Va lues of the Reserve Money and Its Components Used in This Study (Quarterly Data) 
(In 10 Million Turkish Lira) 
Sources of Reserve Money 
Uses of 
Reser ve Reserve Monev 
Money Govt. Liab. SEEs Cred. Banking Foreign Other Bank Foreign Sector Liab 
Currency 
RP<=:Pl"VP,f'; to Cen. Bk. to Cen.Bk. ltn ('pn Plr Liabilities Items (Net) Reserves in Circula. 
808 176 681 88 140 -148 -1 29 242 566 
828 178 712 59 142 -132 -131 232 596 
872 182 724 92 157 -138 -145 249 623 
904 193 730 81 160 -136 -124 295 609 
941 193 771 74 140 -111 -126 269 672 
902 181 763 84 16 8 -147 -147 264 638 
1043 195 767 136 212 -164 -103 298 745 
1084 193 797 124 259 -196 - 93 368 716 
1058 178 806 127 261 -145 -1 69 330 728 
1059 230 788 91 309 -13 8 - 221 338 721 
1163 176 808 172 318 -165 -146 366 797 
1278 198 849 162 379 -200 -110 407 871 
1207 1 80 880 146 351 -162 -1 88 407 800 
1250 1 88 882 146 344 -1 74 -136 441 809 
1323 194 918 164 376 -176 -153 482 841 
1385 220 919 150 444 -225 -123 578 807 
1363 255 993 130 435 -232 -218 522 841 
1382 275 993 13 6 466 - 266 - 222 535 847 
1488 308 1003 146 549 -321 -197 575 913 














1 972. 2 
1972.3 
1 972 . 4 
1973 .1 
1973 . 2 
1973 . 3 
1973. 4 
1974.1 
1 974. 2 
1974 .3 
1974.4 
Appendix Tab le I (Continued) 
The Values of the Reserve Money and Its Components Used in This Study (Quarterly Data) 
(In 10 Mi llion Turkish Lira) 
Sources of Reser ve Money 
Uses of 
Reserve Reserve Money 
Money Foreign Govt. Liab. SEEs Cred . Hankrng F or e ign Other Bank Currency 
Sector Liab 
R eserves to Cen. Bk. to Cen. Bk. tn (;p n P.lr · Liabilities Items (Net) Reserves in Circula 
1510 335 1136 110 575 -316 - 330 612 898 
1486 300 1138 111 626 -331 - 358 .568 918 
1732 766 1133 163 663 - 764 - 229 670 1062 
1834 864 1135 183 631 - 848 -13 1 733 1101 
1930 881 1109 191 550 - 54 -747 814 1116 
2077 853 1242 226 493 - 46 - 691 907 1170 
2364 1034 1276 386 414 - 56 - 690 1011 1353 
2620 1289 1237 383 497 - 77 - 709 1228 1392 
2690 1542 1475 384 301 - 90 - 922 1219 1400 
2694 1438 1454 355 336 - 17 -872 1278 1416 
3176 1862 1491 458 342 - 20 - 957 1488 1688 
3590 2211 1475 418 570 - 27 -1057 1992 1598 
3692 2678 1467 395 570 - 56 - 1362 1977 1715 
3725 2761 1462 326 891 - 57 -1658 1963 1762 
4179 3187 1509 371 1010 - 72 - 1 826 2113 2066 
4405 3170 1597 355 1317 - 37 - 1997 2341 2064 
4789 3374 1715 473 1333 - 51 - 2055 2596 2193 
4955 3124 1715 503 1545 - 62 -1870 2637 2317 
5449 3155 1874 780 1487 - 76 - 1771 2628 2821 
5714 2660 2005 1364 2238 - 71 - 2482 3037 2677 













1962 , 2 
1962 , 3 
1962.4 
1963 .1 






1964 . 4 
Appendix Tab le 2 
The Shar es of the Reser ve Money Components in the Tota l Reser ve Money (Quar ter ly Data) 
(as per centage) 
Sources of Reser ve Money 
Uses of 
Reser ve Reser ve Money 
Money l.< 'oreign :!Govt Liab jSEEs Liab Commerc. Foreign Other Item~ Bank Res . Share of [Res . Assets. · · · Bank. Sec . ~ur :r: en~ l ~h~rP. Share Share Share Liab Shar e Share Share 1 n "'r~11 '~ , 
- - ·· 
100 16 29 48 52 22 24 22 78 
100 16 28 48 57 21 28 22 78 
100 44 25 46 53 51 17 20 80 
100 44 31 37 55 42 25 25 75 
100 40 35 35 51 36 27 22 78 
100 41 104 4 15 38 26 19 81 
100 40 95 5 20 35 24 19 81 
100 38 93 4 16 29 23 25 75 
100 37 92 5 13 24 23 22 78 
100 38 95 3 15 32 19 20 80 
100 35 88 7 16 31 16 21 79 
100 33 91 6 18 27 20 25 75 
100 31 92 6 16 24 22 24 76 
100 32 97 9 20 31 28 23 77 
100 31 94 11 24 32 29 23 77 
100 31 89 15 18 30 23 26 74 
100 26 90 11 18 26 20 25 75 
100 27 93 10 18 26 21 24 76 
100 21 87 11 22 25 17 23 77 








1965 . 4 
1966, 1 
1966,2 
1966 . 3 
1966 . 4 
1967, 1 
1967.2 






1969 , 1 
1969, 2 
1969. 3 
1969 , 4 
Appendix Tab le 2 (Continued) 
The Shar es of the Reser ve Money Comp onent s in the Tota l Reserve Money (Quarterly Data) 
(as per centage) 
Us es of 
Reser ve 
Sources of Reserve Money Reser ve Monev 
Money Foreign Govt. Liab. SEEs Liab. Commerc Foreign Other ItemE Bank Res. Shar e of Res . Assets 
Share Shar e Ba illi . Sec . Liab. Share 
currency 
C!~ ~ ... o are Share Shar e n circula 
100 22 84 11 17 18 16 30 70 
100 21 86 7 17 16 16 28 72 
100 21 83 11 18 16 17 29 71 
100 21 81 9 18 15 14 33 67 
100 20 82 8 15 12 13 29 71 
100 20 85 9 19 16 16 29 71 
100 19 74 13 20 16 10 29 71 
100 18 74 11 24 18 9 34 66 
100 17 76 12 25 14 16 31 69 
100 22 74 9 29 13 21 32 68 
100 15 69 15 27 14 13 31 69 
100 15 66 13 30 16 9 32 68 
100 15 73 12 29 13 16 34 66 
100 15 71 12 28 14 11 35 65 
100 15 69 12 28 13 12 36 64 
100 16 66 11 32 16 9 42 58 
100 19 73 10 32 17 16 38 62 
100 20 72 10 34 19 16 39 61 
100 21 67 10 37 22 13 3 9 61 
























1974 . 4 
Appendix Table 2 (Continued) 
The Shares of the Reserve Money Components in the Total Reserve Money (Quarter ly Data) 
(as percentage) 
Sources of Reserve Money 
Uses of 
Reserve Reserve Monev 
Money J<'ore1gn Govt. Liab. SEEs Liab. IL'ommerc. Foreign Other Items Bank Res. Share of [Res. Assets Bank. Sec. currency 
Share Share Share Share Liab. Share Share Share in circula. 
100 22 75 7 38 21 22 41 59 
100 20 77 7 42 22 24 38 62 
100 44 65 9 38 44 13 39 61 
100 47 62 10 34 46 7 40 60 
100 46 57 10 28 3 39 42 58 
100 41 60 11 24 2 33 44 56 
100 44 54 16 18 2 29 43 57 
100 49 47 15 19 3 27 47 53 
100 57 55 14 11 3 34 48 52 
100 53 54 13 12 1 32 47 53 
100 59 47 14 11 1 30 47 53 
100 62 41 12 16 1 29 55 45 
100 73 40 11 15 2 37 54 46 
100 74 39 9 24 2 45 53 47 
100 76 36 9 24 2 44 51 49 
100 72 36 8 30 1 45 53 47 
100 70 36 10 28 1 43 54 46 
100 63 35 10 31 1 38 53 47 
100 58 34 14 27 1 32 48 52 
100 47 35 24 39 1 43 53 47 
Note: Totals may not be equal to 100 % because of rounding. 
























Appendix Table 3 
The Absolute One-Period Changes in Reserve Money and Its Components (Quarterly Data) 
(In 10 Million TL) 
Sources of Reserve Money 
Uses of 
Reserve Reserve Money 
Money Foreign Govt. SEEs Liab. Banking Foreign Other Bank Currency Sector Liab 
Reserves Liabilities to Cen. Bk. o Cen Bk. Liabilities Items <Net) Reserves in Circula 
16 - 1 25 - 1 - 9 4 - 6 2 14 
4 0 - 4 3 22 0 17 - 1 5 
28 145 -10 1 - 4 150 - 46 - 6 34 
23 9 40 - 35 25 - 31 47 34 -11 
1 -21 21 - 8 -19 -35 7 -16 17 
- 22 - 5 330 -1 64 -1 88 3 - 8 -21 - 1 
34 7 -13 8 30 0 - 2 7 27 
28 5 18 - 6 -17 - 26 - 2 40 -12 
13 - 2 3 7 -14 - 23 4 -14 27 
- 26 - 7 - 5 -12 8 38 -28 -1 6 -10 
48 3 4 28 12 8 - 9 12 36 
12 -11 25 - 7 15 - 21 31 26 -14 
19 - 1 26 4 -11 -1 2 11 0 19 
- 23 - 1 8 14 22 33 33 -10 -13 
24 - 2 7 13 31 15 10 5 19 
42 14 7 33 -31 3 -22 27 15 
16 -29 18 - 22 3 - 25 - 21 1 15 
-8 2 12 -18 - 1 - 2 5 -10 2 
78 -18 33 21 45 13 -10 8 70 
















1 967. 4 
1 968.1 
1968.2 
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Appendix Tab le 3 (Continued) 
The Abso lute One-Peri od Cha nges in Reser ve Mone y a nd Its Components (Quar terly Data) 
(In 10 Million TL) 
Sour c e s of Reser ve Money 
Uses of 
Reserve Reserve Money 
Money Foreign Govt. SEEs Liab . Banking Bank Currency 
Sector Liab For e ign Ot her 
Reserves Liabilities to Cen.Bk. ltn r'An "Rk- Li::ihi liti a c Items (Net) Reserves i n Circula. 
- 2 -29 59 - 15 - 23 - 26 20 1 - 3 
20 2 31 - 29 2 - 16 2 -1 0 30 
44 4 12 33 15 6 14 17 27 
32 11 6 - 11 3 - 2 - 21 46 -14 
37 0 41 - 7 - 20 - 25 2 - 26 63 
- 39 - 12 - 8 10 28 36 21 - 5 - 34 
141 14 4 52 44 17 - 44 34 107 
41 - 2 30 -1 2 47 32 - 10 70 - 29 
- 26 - 15 9 3 2 - 51 76 -38 12 
1 52 -1 8 - 36 48 - 7 52 8 - 7 
104 - 54 20 81 9 27 - 75 28 76 
11 5 22 41 -1 0 61 35 - 36 41 74 
- 71 -1 8 31 -1 6 - 28 - 38 78 0 - 71 
43 8 2 0 - 7 12 - 52 34 9 
73 6 36 18 32 2 17 41 32 
62 26 1 - 14 68 49 - 30 96 - 34 
- 22 35 74 - 20 - 9 7 95 - 56 34 
19 20 0 6 31 34 4 13 6 
106 33 10 10 83 55 - 25 40 66 

























Appendix Table 3 (Continued) 
The Absolute One-Period Changes in Reserve Money and Its Components (Quarterly Data) 
(in 10 Million TL) 




Money Foreign Govt. SEEs Liab. 
Banking Foreign Other Bank Currency Sector Lial: 
Reserves Liabilities to Cen. Bk to Cen Bk · Liabilities Items fNetl Reserves in Circula 
-62 - 7 83 -58 - 2 - 44 122 - 73 11 
-24 - 35 2 1 51 15 28 -44 20 
246 466 - 5 52 37 433 -129 102 144 
102 98 2 20 - 32 84 -98 63 39 
96 17 -26 8 - 81 - 794 616 81 15 
147 - 28 133 35 -57 - 8 - 56 93 54 
287 181 34 160 -59 10 - 1 104 183 
256 255 -39 - 3 83 21 19 217 39 
70 253 238 1 -196 13 213 62 8 
4 -104 -21 - 29 35 -73 - 50 -12 16 
482 424 37 103 6 3 85 210 272 
414 349 -16 -40 228 7 100 504 - 90 
102 467 - 8 -23 0 29 305 -15 117 
33 83 - 5 -69 321 1 296 -14 47 
454 426 47 45 119 15 168 150 304 
226 -17 88 -16 307 -3 5 171 228 - 2 
384 204 118 118 16 14 58 255 129 
166 -250 0 30 212 11 -1 85 42 124 
4 94 31 159 277 - 58 14 - 99 -10 504 
265 - 495 131 584 751 - 5 711 409 -144 
Source: Internationa l Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics , Turkey Section, various issues. 
-:i ,.,.. 
Appendix Tnble 4 
The Percentage Change of Reserve Money and Its Compone nts From Previous Period (Quarterly Data) 
(as percentage) 
Sources of Reserve Money 
Uses of 
Reserve Reserve Mone v 
Period 
Money Foreign Govt. Liab . SEEs Cred . Bankrng Foreign Other Bank Sector Liab Currency 
Reserves to Cen. Bk. to Cen. Bk. [tr, ,'e,n Ulr · Liabilities Items <Net Reserves in Circula, 
1960.1 4 - 1 23 0 - 4 - 4 5 2 4 
1960, 2 1 0 - 3 1 9 0 -15 - 1 1 
1960,3 6 199 - 8 0 - 2 - 151 36 - 6 9 
1960. 4 5 4 33 -16 10 12 -57 35 - 3 
1961.1 0 - 9 13 - 4 - 7 16 - 5 -12 4 
1961. 2 - 4 - 2 181 -90 -71 - 2 5 -1 8 0 
1961,3 7 3 - 3 44 39 0 2 8 7 
1961. 4 5 2 4 -23 -16 14 2 40 - 3 
1962,1 2 - 1 1 35 -16 14 - 3 -10 7 
1962,2 - 5 - 3 - 1 -44 11 - 28 22 -13 - 2 
1962,3 9 1 1 187 14 - 5 9 11 8 
1962,4 2 - 5 5 16 16 11 -34 21 - 3 
1963. 1 3 - 1 5 11 -10 7 - 9 0 4 
1963. 2 - 4 - 1 1 35 22 -22 -25 - 7 - 3 
1963. 3 4 - 1 1 24 26 - 8 - 6 4 4 
1963. 4 7 7 1 49 -20 - 2 12 19 3 
1964.1 2 -14 3 -22 2 12 14 1 3 
1964.2 - 1 1 2 -23 - 1 1 - 4 - 6 0 
1964,3 12 -10 5 35 37 - 7 7 5 14 




Appendix Table 4 (C ontinued) 




Sources of Reserve Money Reserve Money 
Period 
Money Foreign Govt. Liab. SEEs Cred. Bankrng Foreign Other Bank Currenc y Sector Lial: 
Reserves to Cen. Bk. to Cen. Bk . it " r" P n Rk Liabiliti es Items (Net) Reserves in Circ ula 
1965.1 0 - 14 9 -15 - 14 15 -1 8 0 - 1 
1965. 2 2 1 5 -33 1 11 - 2 - 5 5 
1965.3 5 2 2 56 11 - 5 - 11 7 5 
1965, 4 4 6 1 -12 2 1 14 18 - 2 
1966.1 4 0 6 - 9 -12 18 - 2 - 9 10 
1966. 2 - 4 - 6 - 1 14 20 -32 - 17 - 2 - 5 
1966.3 16 8 1 62 26 -12 30 13 17 
1966 . 4 4 - 1 4 - 9 22 -20 10 23 - 4 
1967.1 - 2 - 8 1 2 1 26 - 82 -10 2 
1967.2 0 29 - 2 - 28 18 5 - 31 2 - 1 
1967.3 10 - 23 3 89 3 -20 34 8 11 
1967. 4 10 12 5 - 6 19 - 21 25 11 9 
1968.1 - 6 - 9 4 -1 0 - 7 19 - 71 0 - 8 
1968.2 4 4 0 0 - 2 - 7 28 8 1 
1968. 3 6 3 4 12 9 - 1 -12 9 4 
1968.4 5 13 0 - 9 18 - 28 20 20 - 4 
1969.1 - 2 16 8 13 - 2 - 3 - 77 -1 0 4 
1969. 2 1 8 0 5 7 -1 5 - 2 2 1 
1969.3 8 12 1 7 18 - 21 11 7 8 




Appendix Tab le 4 (Continued ) 




Sources of Reserve Money Reserve Money 
Period 
Money Foreign Govt. Liab . SEEs Cred. Banking Foreign Other Bank Currency Sector Lial: 
Reserves to Cen.Bk. to Cen. Bk. lrn (;P.n Rk Liabilities Items (Net) Reserves in Circula 
1970.1 - 4 - 2 8 - 35 0 12 - 59 -11 1 
1970. 2 - 2 -10 0 1 9 - 5 - 8 - 7 2 
1970. 3 17 155 0 47 6 - 131 36 18 16 
1970.4 6 13 0 12 - 5 -11 43 9 4 
1971.1 6 2 - 2 4 -13 94 - 470 11 1 
1971. 2 8 - 3 12 18 -10 15 7 11 5 
1971. 3 14 21 3 71 -16 -22 0 :,1 16 
1971.4 11 25 - 3 - 1 20 -37 - 3 ~1 3 
1972 . 1 3 20 19 0 -39 -17 -30 5 1 
1972 . 2 0 - 7 - 1 - 8 12 81 5 - 1 1 
1972.3 18 29 3 29 2 -18 -10 16 19 
1972.4 13 19 - 1 - 9 67 -35 -10 34 - 5 
1973. 1 3 21 - 1 - 6 0 -107 -29 - 1 7 
1973.2 1 3 0 -17 56 - 2 - 22 - 1 3 
1973.3 12 15 3 14 13 -26 -10 7 17 
1973. 4 5 0 6 - 4 30 49 - 9 11 0 
1974.1 9 6 7 33 1 -3 8 - 3 11 6 
1974.2 3 - 7 0 6 16 -22 9 2 6 
1974.3 10 1 9 55 - 4 -23 5 0 22 
1974. 4 5 -16 7 75 51 7 - 40 16 - 5 
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Appendix Table 5 




Sources of Reserve Money Reserve Money 
Money Foreign Govt . Liab. SEEs Cred . Banking Foreign Other Bank Currency 
Reserves to Cen. Bk. to Cen. Bk. l ~~cf~~ ¼ft IT iahilities Items /Net\ Reser ves in Circula. 
100 - 6 156 - 6 - 56 25 - 37 12 87 
100 0 -100 75 550 0 425 - 25 125 
100 518 -36 4 -14 536 -164 - 21 121 
100 39 174 -152 108 135 204 148 -48 
100 - 2100 2100 -800 -1900 -3 500 700 -1600 1700 
100 23 -1500 745 854 -14 36 95 5 
100 21 -3 8 24 88 0 - 6 21 79 
100 18 64 - 21 -61 -93 - 7 143 - 43 
100 -15 23 54 -108 -177 31 -108 208 
100 27 19 46 -31 -146 108 62 38 
100 6 8 58 25 17 -19 25 75 
100 -92 208 -58 125 -175 258 217 -117 
100 - 5 137 21 - 58 -63 58 0 100 
100 4 -35 - 61 - 96 -143 - 143 43 57 
100 - 8 29 54 129 62 42 21 79 
100 33 17 79 - 74 7 - 52 64 36 
100 -181 112 - 137 19 -156 -131 6 94 
100 - 25 -150 225 12 25 - 62 125 - 25 
100 - 23 42 27 58 17 - 13 10 90 

























Appendix Table 5 (Continued ) 
The Breakdown of the Total Change of Reser ve Money From Previous Period (Quar ter ly Data) 
(as percentage) 
Sources of Reserve Money 
Uses of 
Reserve Reserve Monev 
Money Foreign Govt. Liab. SEEs Cred. Banking Foreign Other Bank Currency Sector Liab 
Reserves to Cen. Bk to Cen. Bk ·r, {"',::,n UL,. Liabilities Items fNet) Reserves in Circula 
100 1450 - 2950 750 1150 1300 -1000 -50 150 
100 10 155 -145 10 -80 10 -50 150 
100 9 27 75 34 14 32 39 61 
100 34 19 -34 9 - 6 -66 144 -44 
100 0 111 -19 -54 -68 5 -70 170 
100 31 21 -26 -72 -92 -54 13 87 
100 10 3 37 31 12 -31 24 76 
100 - 5 73 - 29 115 78 -24 171 -71 
100 58 -35 -12 - 8 196 -292 147 -46 
100 5200 -1800 -3600 4800 -700 5200 800 -700 
100 -52 19 79 9 26 -72 27 73 
100 19 36 - 9 53 30 -31 36 64 
100 25 -44 23 39 54 -110 0 100 
100 19 5 0 - 16 28 -121 79 21 
100 8 49 25 44 3 23 56 44 
100 42 2 -23 110 79 -48 155 -55 
100 -159 -336 91 44 -32 -432 255 -155 
100 105 0 32 163 179 21 69 32 
100 31 9 9 78 52 - 24 38 62 

























Appendix Tab le 5 (Continued) 
The Breakdown of the Total Change of Reserve Money From Previous Period (Quarter ly Data) 
(as percentage) 
Sources of Reserve Money 
Uses of 
Reserve Reserve Money 
Money Foreign Govt. Liab. SEEs Cred. Harunng Currency 
Sector Liab Foreign Other Bank 
Reserves to Cen. Bk. to Cen. Bk. Ito rPn Rk . T.irihiliti~c:: TtP.mQ (Net) HP.RP.rvP..c:: ~n Circula. 
100 11 -134 94 3 71 -197 118 -18 
100 146 - 8 - 4 - 212 -62 -117 183 -83 
100 189 - 2 21 15 176 - 52 41 59 
100 96 2 20 -31 82 - 96 62 38 
100 18 -27 8 -84 -827 642 84 16 
100 -19 90 24 -39 - 5 - 38 63 37 
100 63 12 56 -28 3 0 36 64 
100 100 -15 - 1 32 8 7 85 15 
100 361 340 1 - 280 19 304 89 11 
100 -2600 -525 -725 875 -1825 -1250 -300 400 
100 88 8 21 1 1 18 44 56 
100 84 - 4 -10 55 2 24 122 -22 
100 458 - 8 -23 0 28 299 -15 115 
100 252 -15 -209 973 3 897 -42 142 
100 94 10 10 26 3 37 33 67 
100 - 8 39 - 7 136 -15 76 101 - 1 
100 53 31 31 4 4 15 66 34 
100 -151 0 18 128 7 -111 25 75 
100 6 32 56 -12 3 -20 - 2 102 
100 -187 49 220 283 - 2 268 154 -54 




















Appendix Table 6 
The Values of the Reserve Money and It s Components Used in This Study (Annua 1 Data) 
(in 10 Million T L) 
Sources of Reserve Money 
Uses of 
Reserve Reserve Monev 
Money Foreign Govt. Liab. SEEs Cred. Banking Foreign Other Bank Currency Sector Lial: 
Reserves to Cen. Bk. to Cen.Bk. t n 0an Dir Liabilities Items (Net) Reserves in circula. 
480 147 137 215 260 166 113 107 373 
521 207 427 61 133 178 129 111 40 9 
574 204 524 30 90 164 111 126 448 
625 196 581 65 123 175 165 149 475 
727 180 627 80 144 177 128 185 541 
853 182 711 80 149 138 132 254 598 
992 190 774 104 194 129 142 299 692 
1139 195 820 138 316 162 168 360 779 
1291 195 899 151 378 184 149 477 814 
1451 295 1010 145 506 294 211 579 872 
1640 566 1135 141 623 568 257 645 994 
2247 1014 1216 296 488 58 709 990 1257 
3337 1763 1473 403 387 38 952 1512 1525 
4000 2949 1508 361 947 55 1710 2098 1901 
5226 3078 1827 780 1650 65 2044 2724 2502 


















Appendix Tab le 7 
The Shares of the Reserve Money Components in the Total Reserve Money (Annual Data) 
(as percentage) 




Foreign Govt. Liab. SEEs Cr ed. banKrng Foreign Other Bank Currency 
Money Sector Liab 
Reserves to Cen. Bk. to Cen. Bk. ~o Cen.Bk. Liabilities Items (Net) Reserves in circula . 
100 31 29 45 54 35 24 22 78 
100 40 82 12 26 34 25 22 79 
100 36 91 5 16 29 19 22 78 
100 31 93 10 20 28 27 24 76 
100 25 86 11 20 24 18 26 74 
100 21 83 9 18 16 16 30 70 
100 19 78 11 20 13 14 30 70 
100 17 72 12 28 l4 15 32 68 
100 15 70 12 29 14 12 37 63 
100 20 70 10 35 20 15 40 60 
100 35 69 9 38 35 16 39 61 
100 45 54 13 22 3 32 44 56 
100 58 49 13 13 1 31 50 50 
100 74 38 9 24 1 43 52 48 
100 59 35 15 32 1 39 52 48 



















Appendix Tab le 8 
The Absolute One- P eriod Changes in Reserve Money and Its Components (Annual Data) 
(In 10 Million TL) 
Sources of Reserve Money 
Uses of 
Reserve Reserve Money 
Money For eign Govt. SEEs Liab. 
.1:.1an.Krng Foreign Other Bank Currency 
Sector Lia!:: 
Reserves Liabilities to Ce n. Bk. to (;p n Rk Liabilities Items (Net) Reserves in circ ula. 
39 74 27 - 7 12 71 - 4 7 32 
41 59 290 -153 -127 12 16 4 37 
53 - 3 97 -31 -43 -14 - 18 14 38 
51 - 8 57 35 32 11 54 23 27 
102 -16 46 15 21 2 -37 36 66 
126 2 84 0 5 -39 4 69 57 
139 8 63 24 45 - 9 10 45 94 
147 5 46 33 122 :-:S 2 26 60 86 
152 0 80 13 62 22 - 19 117 35 
160 99 111 - 6 128 110 61 102 58 
189 271 125 - 3 117 274 47 67 123 
607 448 80 155 -135 - 510 451 344 263 
790 749 258 107 -101 -20 243 522 268 
763 1186 35 - 42 560 17 759 586 376 
1226 129 318 418 704 10 334 626 600 



















Appendix Tab le 9 
The P ercentag e Change of Reser ve M oney and Its Comp onen ts From P revious Period (A nnua l Data) 
(a s percentage ) 
Sources of Res erve Money ( 
Uses of 
Reserve 
Res erve Money 
Fore ign Govt. Liab . SEEs Cred. BankrnE Foreign Other Bank Currency Money Sector ial: 
Res erve s to Cen. Bk. to Cen . Bk. to Cen Bk ·Lia bilities Items (Ne t ) Reserves in circ ula. 
9 100 25 - 3 5 - 74 4 7 9 
8 40 212 - 71 - 49 - 8 - 14 4 10 
1 0 - 1 23 -51 - 32 8 14 13 9 
9 - 4 11 116 3 6 - 7 -49 1 8 6 
1,6 - 8 8 23 17 - 1 23 24 14 
17 1 13 - 1 4 22 - 3 37 10 
16 5 9 31 30 6 - 8 18 · 16 
15 3 6 32 62 -25 -1 9 20 12 
13 0 10 10 19 -14 11 32 4 
1 2 51 12 - 4 34 - 60 - 41 21 7 
13 92 12 - 2 23 -93 - 22 11 14 
37 79 7 109 - 22 90 - 175 53 26 
35 74 21 36 - 21 34 34 53 21 
32 67 2 -1 0 145 -44 -80 3 9 25 
31 4 21 116 74 - 17 -20 30 32 



















Appendix Table 10 
The Breakdown of the Total Change of Reserve Money From Previous Period (Annual Da ta) 
(as percentage) 
Sources of Reserve Money 
Uses of 
Reserve Monev Reserve 
Money Foreign Govt. Liab, 
SEEs Cred. Banking Foreign Other Bank Currency Sector L1al: 
Reserves to Cen. Bk. to Cen. Bk. tr. ran "Rl. Liabiliti""' [terns (Net) Reserves in 1,ir/"'11 lJ:1 
100 190 70 -1 8 30 184 - 12 17 82 
100 145 713 -377 -312 31 39 10 90 
100 - 5 183 -59 -81 - 27 -34 28 72 
100 -15 112 69 64 22 107 46 54 
100 -16 45 15 21 2 -37 35 65 
100 1 67 0 4 -31 3 55 45 
100 6 45 18 32 - 6 7 32 68 
100 3 31 23 83 22 18 41 59 
100 0 52 9 41 15 -13 77 23 
100 62 69 - 4 80 69 38 64 36 
100 143 66 - 2 62 145 25 35 65 
100 74 13 25 -22 - 84 74 57 43 
100 95 33 14 -13 - 3 31 66 34 
100 123 4 - 4 58 2 78 61 39 
100 11 26 34 57 1 27 51 49 
Source: International Monetary Fund , Internadonal Financial Statistics, Turkey Section, various issue,s. 
co 
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Appendix Tab le 11 
Estimated Equations for the Time Paths of the Variables of the Model 
Dummy variables take the value 1 for the following specified periods and zero otherwise. 
D
1 
= For the period after 1970/ 3. 
D
2 
= For the years after 1971. 
D
3 
= For the period before 1961/ 3. 
D 
4 
= For the first quarters of the year. 
D 5 = For the period after 197 4/3 . 
D
6 
= For the third quarters, after 1961/2 . 
D
7 
= For all quarters after 1971/ 2. 
D 
8 















s t.a nt 
6 .01 
(257 ,1 0) 
5,91 






(32 ,1 7) 
2 , 97 





Append ix Table 11 





R2 ,I Q=Qua j Dummies DW ter ly Time 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Y= 
IAnnua l 
. 024 .040 -1.14 . 992 1,10 Q 
(2 6 , 88) (1. 33) (35. 05 
,102 - 1,15 . 997 2,46 y 
I 
(23 . 30) (27 . 65 · 
,040 - , 61 8 -,23 8 ,040 . 993 1. 21 Q 
(43. 95) (2. 02) (7, 10) (2 . 20) 
,172 . 977 1 ,12 y 
(24. 73) 
.055 2,1 6 . 875 . 900 • 912 Q 
(20 , 98) (14. 31 (2 . 80) 
,056 2 , 22 , 642 . 790 2.21 .560 Q 
(12. 32) (9 . 23) (2.46) 
.1 80 1 . 92 . 583 . 924 2.58 y 
(9. 6 0) (8 . 06) (1 . 98) 
. 01 6 .227 . 138 . 929 . 080 . 923 . 818 Q 
(9 . 18) (3 . 64) (2. 00) (7. 08) (2. 05) 
(Continued) 














































(4. 30 ) 
,137 
(8. 84 ) 
Appendix Tab le 11 (Continued ) 
Es t imated Equa t ions for t he Time P a ths of the Var iables of the Model 
Regress o rs I I Data Used 
r R 2 / 
~Quar 
Dummies DW ~er ly 
Y = 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Annua I 
0,78 - . 078 . 568 .073 ,670 1. 98 . 835 Q 
(. 820) (. 794) (5. 99) (3. 85) 
.194 ,586 . 937 1_ 1. 73 y 
(1. 7 8) (4. 30) 
-.404 1. 5 6 . 908 . 521 Q 
(3.19) (3.19) 
-.060 1,28 . 650 2.01 . 833 Q 
(. 347) (6 . 96) 
1.34 . 888 1. 62 y 
(5. 08) 
-.188 . 617 . 873 .363 Q 
(1. 71) (5. 07) 
- .016 .307 .329 2.05 . 919 Q 
(. 12 ) (2. 2 8) 
.518 . 872 1. 42 y 
(2. 3 8 ) 
(Conti nued ) 
00 
00 
Appendix Table 11 (Continued) 
Estimated Equations for the T ime Paths of the \·ariables of the ~1odel 
Re gr ess o rs I Data \ Used , 





Variable s tant 
Time Y = 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Annua l 
Log(CU) 5. 79 .026 . 221 
. 051 . 972 .256 Q 
(197 . 41) (23 .09) (4 . 96) (1. 75) 
Log(CU ) 5 . 13 . 043 .046 
.058 . 644 2.4 8 . 951 Q 
(14 . 37) (6 . 36) (1. 03) (7 .16) 
Log(CU) 5 . 78 .104 .311 
.311 .988 1. 9 0 y 
(159 .13) (20. 3 9) (5 .14) 
(5.14 ) 
Log(BR ) 4.26 .054 . 283 
. 378 - .073 . 991 1. 28 Q 
(113 . 27) (42 .50) (5. 3 8) 
(8 . 09) (2. 4 9) 
Log(BR) 4.1 9 .216 .393 
.401 . 996 2 . 90 y 
(78 . 92) (3 1. 32 ) (4 . 76) 
(5. 91) 
Log(BR ) 4 . 19 . 215 . 33 8 
.425 . 999 2.46 -.5 99 y 
(147 . 21) (57 . 48) (7 . 43) 
(11.12 
Log(RE) 5 . 93 . 03 5 .134 
.375 . 039 .989 . 644 Q 
(203 . 60) (3 5 .49) (3 .25) 
(10.31 (1. 73 ) 
Log(RE) 5 . 34 .051 . 070 
. 082 .022 . 624 2 .54 . 946 Q 
(15 . 94 ) (7 . 80 ) (1. 44) 
(1. 74) (2. 66) 
Log(RE) 5 . 9 4 .137 
. 418 . 990 .198 I 
y 
(125 . 7 9) (21. 50 ) (6 05 ) • I I • r i i I 



















Appendix Table 12 
Estimated Relationships Between Imports (Dependent Variab les ) Nomina l Income and Money 
Data Coefficients Var. of Coefficients n 2 (if cor rected 
for autoc orr .) Unit Constraint Indep . Var. Constra int Indep. Var. _ ,,'J 
$ - 223 - . 055 1653 • 57-05 . 974 
$ - 219 - . 054 44 91 . 10- 04 . 956 .442 
TL - 4670 1.. 22 .13+07 . 47 -02 0 958 
TL - 355 1. 73 . 20+09 . 14 - 01 . 940 . 961 
$ - 474 -.073 4749 . 27 - 04 . 934 
$ - 29 . 2 - . 081 6759 . 27-04 . 949 . 438 
T L - 5568 1. 61 . 35+07 . 20-01 . 899 
TL -13223 2 .. 11 . 1724+08 0 52-01 . 868 . 636 
$ - 241 - .241 2266 . 15-03 0 964 
$ - 137 - .264 17219 . 41-03 . 927 .761 
TL - 4 043 5.32 . 24+07 . 1721 . 921 



















Appendix Table 12 (Continued) 
Estimated Relationships Between Imports (Dependent Variables) Nominal Income and Money 
Indep . Data Coefficients Var. of Coefficients R2 (if corrected D.W. 
Var. Unit Constraint Indep. Var. Constraint Indep. Var. for aut_ocorr.) 
Ms2 $ - 284 - ,184 2144 . 92 -04 . 963 , 519 
Ms $ - 104 - ,210 28241 ,30-03 , 917 . 820 , 820 2 
Ms TL - 3034 4 001 ,2529 ,109 . 913 , 899 2 ,_ 
Ms 
2 TL -30898 6,52 . 371 +o9 . 883 . 787 . 939 
1,32 
RE $ - 291 - .426 1066 • 24-0~ _ - , 981 , 926 
RE $ - 270 -.434 - ·- - 3684 . 51-03 . 965 ,527 1. 90 
RE TL - 2995 9.35 .1569+o7 . 363 . 945 1.12 
RE TL - 84 83 11 0 90 . 29+o 8 1. 81 . 857 . 796 1.45 -
-
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